Showing posts with label Rwanda. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Rwanda. Show all posts

Sunday, 18 July 2010

l'allée suite

or Never again? or Perfidious Albion? or Not unalloyed?
Up, Down, Appendices, Postscript.

the best thing about losing your memory is that everything is ever and always new :-)the first time I thought about it all this way, that we are each and every one alone, (that I can remember :-) was in relation to some photographs by Chris Simpson from Madagascar, then this week I watched a suite of movies around the 1994 genocide in Rwanda (listed in the Appendix) and the last few frames of Beyond The Gates (aka Shooting Dogs) as Marie runs for Burundi, a-and noticing that the image completes a Victorian arch with the initial images in the film, gave me this:
Beyond The GatesBeyond The GatesBeyond The GatesBeyond The GatesBeyond The Gates
Marie's gaze, Claire-Hope Ashitey's gaze ... really I wanted to find a profile of Valentina Iribagiza from Nyarubuye somehow from Frontline's Ghosts Of Rwanda but movies not being 3-D and all ... and using Bill Clinton's smirk was also unsatisfactory given the scale of the denial, and putting the three frames side by each was unsatisfactory ... blah blah blah, whatever ...

my old friend Keith called it 'isolato' ... there was another opposite term but I have forgotten what it was ... 'communal' I think, and of course we differed on who was what and what was what ... later on he came up with a theory that there were in fact two species of human, one with compassion and one without, Kurt Vonnegut had a similar notion with his PPs - Pathological Personalities I think it was ...

Christine ShellyChristine Shellyif there are special circles in hell then Christine Shelly aka Christine Shelley and her kind should have one, not only close to being gramatically illiterate, she was the epitome of American moral illiteracy, the infamous exchange: "How many acts of genocide does it take to make a genocide? Um, Alan, that's just not a question that I'm in a position to answer" ... it is unkind to speak ill of the dead (they say) and she died of cancer in 2006 at a relatively young age - 54, I thought of doing a montage à la Marilyn Monroe/Andy Warhol, I imagine she said about the same thing many times but I could only find images of her wearing the two dresses shown (April 28 & June 10), and anyway it was a deep and rich vein of evil (or river of shit as the Fugs would call it) that she was swimming in, digging and delving, all the way from Bill Clinton, Warren Christopher, David Rawson, Prudence Bushnell, Madeleine Albright, Anthony Lake, (one two one two and through and through) in the American structure, and perfectly symmetrical at the United Nations: Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Kofi Annan, (the vorpal blade went snicker snack) ... "from the Grand Coulee dam to the Capitol, idiot wind, blowing every time you move your teeth."

They speak vanity every one with his neighbour: with flattering lips and with a double heart do they speak.
     Psalm 12.

He has two hearts instead of one. She cried, "Young man, what have ye done?"
     The Swallow.

in Ghosts of Rwanda you can see both Bill Clinton and Madelaine Albright mouthing the hollow old saws about hindsight; "if we'd known then what we know now" and "things look different in retrospect" and more ... but it is a lie, they knew, they all knew.

if there is hope it might look something like Valentina Iribagiza, she says, "I do not know why I did not die. But maybe God had a plan for me to live."
Valentina IribagizaValentina IribagizaValentina IribagizaValentina IribagizaValentina IribagizaValentina IribagizaValentina IribagizaValentina IribagizaValentina IribagizaValentina Iribagiza
... 'maybe' indeed ... the stories (3-1 & 3-2 below) and the pictures make 'too personal a tale' and it is not just a brutal story with a happy ending, the purveyors, including myself, are careless about details, don't really understand it at all ... and so on ...

He's quoted for a most perfidious slave,
With all the spots o' the world tax'd and debosh'd;
Whose nature sickens but to speak a truth.
Am I or that or this for what he'll utter,
That will speak any thing?

     speaking about Parolles in All's Well That Ends Well: V, 3.

all of my thinking always brings me back eventually to the good Samaritan and the Golden Rule, God has gone to god for me, de-morphed? but I am still ruminating on the bottom lines laid out by Clive Hamilton and Bill McKibben (here, here, & here) - liminality, community, love.

Happy Birthday! to Nelson Mandela at 92.Happy Birthday Nelson Mandelaand the crazy old fuck is still smilin' :-)and it winds back for me to the very end of Coetzee's story of Michael K and his pumpkins, and yeah, if I don't get some shelter soon maybe I'm gonna fade away too, that's ok, bound to happen eventually, all good :-) and 'soon' is a relative term :-)


Postscript:
what might be a few minor victories (items 1-1, 1-2, & 2 in the Appendix), as environment ministers begin to at least look in the right direction, and the courts of BC may strike a blow against the robocops, but who can say?

and here's something, my brother-in-law loved to read P.D. James stories ... The Children of Men, 1992 by P.D. James, and Children of Men, 2006 by Alfonso Cuarón (uTorrent).

and an American lawyer with a conscience apparently, Lieutenant-Colonel Jon S. Jackson looks like he is going to bat for Omar Khadr, while on the k-k-Canadian side we have the entirely DIS-Honourable Minister of IN-Justice, Rob Nicholson.

and finally, just a few shots from Bliss:
Honey Barbara / Helen JonesEucalyptus melliodora / Yellow BoxHarry Joy / Barry Otto
Helen Jones as Honey Barbara, a detail of Eucalyptus melliodora aka Yellow Box tree that Harry planted in his eight-year love letter, and Barry Otto as Harry Joy,

here is a bit of one of Harry Joy's stories: "In New York, there are towers of glass. It is the most terrible and beautiful city on Earth. All good, all evil exists there. If you know where to look, you can find the Devil, that is where he lives. If you keep your eyes peeled you can see him drive down 42nd Street in a Cadillac."

Peter Carey, the author of the novel Bliss now lives there apparently; nothing is as simple as we would like it to be eh? when I was fossicking about at SlowTV I noticed his closing address at the Sydney Writers' Festival, May of this year ... I just listened to a few minutes of the beginning of it then, sort of went uh? and passed on ... more later maybe ...



Appendices:
Rwanda Genocide films: Wikipedia List (incomplete)
1997: NFB The Rwanda Series;
2004: PBS Frontline, Ghosts of Rwanda, uTorrent;
2004: Hotel Rwanda, uTorrent;
2005: Sometimes in April, uTorrent;
2005: Shooting Dogs/Beyond The Gates, uTorrent;
2006: Un dimanche à Kigali/A Sunday in Kigali, uTorrent;
2007: Shake Hands with the Devil, uTorrent;
2008: NFB Triage: Dr. James Orbinski's Humanitarian Dilemma;
2009: Le jour ou Dieu est parti en voyage/The Day God Stayed/Walked Away, uTorrent.

1-1. A Tale of Two Targets, NYT Editorial, July 15 2010.
1-2. Europe needs to reduce emissions by 30%, FT, July 14 2010.
2. Braidwood commission lawyers refute Taser challenge, CP, July 9 2010.
3-1. Valentine’s Story, Holy Trinity United Methodist Church, Sunday, January 18 2009.
3-2. Testimony of Valentina Izibagiza, SURF.


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A Tale of Two Targets, NYT Editorial, July 15 2010.

The Senate spent this week searching for ways to water down the modest greenhouse gas emissions targets in the House-passed energy bill, which opponents claim — wrongly and shortsightedly — will injure the economy. The British, French and German environmental ministers showed a lot more sense this week.

They issued a bold call in The Financial Times for all European Union governments to approve stricter emissions targets, arguing that it would encourage private investment in low emissions technology and hone Europe’s export edge in low carbon goods and services.

Ministerial exhortations are one thing; binding legislation is another. Europe has generally talked a better climate-protection game than it has delivered. Yet this week’s contrast in directions is embarrassing for President Obama, who once pledged to fight for the stricter House targets, and for the United States.

At December’s climate conference in Copenhagen, most countries agreed in principle to try to hold global temperature increases to 2 degrees Celsius, by midcentury, which mainstream scientists regard as the threshold for preventing potentially catastrophic climate changes.

Achieving that will, they believe, require reducing worldwide greenhouse gas emissions by some 80 percent by 2050. Every nation will have to contribute, though not necessarily in equal measure. The House version of this year’s energy bill called for a 17 percent cut from 2005 emissions levels by 2020. The three ministers, by contrast, call for reinstating a European target of 30 percent reductions from much lower 1990 levels by 2020.

The European Union deferred that target, in part because of the economic strains of the global recession. But the ministers point out that the recession, by slowing economic activity across Europe, has actually made the original 30 percent target easier and cheaper to achieve. And they rightly note the potential export benefits for Europe of being a leading low-carbon producer.

Nobody expects the Senate to go as far as the European ministers advocate. But there is no excuse for the Senate’s backward march. We all live on the same planet, and it is getting warmer.



***************************************************************************
Europe needs to reduce emissions by 30%, FT, July 14 2010.

By Chris Huhne/UK climate change secretary, Norbert Röttgen/German federal environment minister and Jean-Louis Borloo/French environment minister.

Europe’s current focus on recovery from recession must not distract us from the question of what kind of economy we want to build. Unless we set our countries on a path to a sustainable low-carbon future, we will face continued uncertainty and significant costs from energy price volatility and a destabilising climate.

This is why we today set out our belief that the European Union should raise its emissions target. A reduction of 30 per cent from 1990 levels by 2020 would represent a real incentive for innovation and action in the international context. It would be a genuine attempt to restrict the rise in global temperatures to 2°C – the key climate danger threshold – stiffening the resolve of those already proposing ambitious action and encouraging those waiting in the wings. It would also make good business sense.

The current target of a 20 per cent reduction now seems insufficient to drive the low-carbon transition. The recession by itself has cut emissions in the EU’s traded sector by 11 per cent from pre-crisis levels. Partly as a result, the price of carbon is far too low to stimulate significant investment in green jobs and technologies.

If we stick to a 20 per cent cut, Europe is likely to lose the race to compete in the low-carbon world to countries such as China, Japan or the US – all of which are looking to create a more attractive environment for low-carbon investment.

By moving to a higher target, the EU would have a direct impact on the carbon price through to 2020 and also send a strong signal of our commitment to a low-carbon policy framework in the longer term. We must not forget that building a low-carbon future depends overwhelmingly on the private sector. Moving to a 30 per cent target would provide greater certainty and predictability for investors.

Europe’s companies are poised to take advantage of the new opportunities. They currently have a global market share of 22 per cent of the low-carbon goods and services sector, thanks to Europe’s early leadership in tackling climate change. But the rest of the world is catching up. The Copenhagen commitments, though less ambitious than we had hoped, have triggered widespread action, notably in China, India and Japan.

Because of reduced emissions in the recession, the annual costs in 2020 of meeting the existing 20 per cent target are down a third from €70bn ($89bn, £59bn) to €48bn. A move up to 30 per cent is now estimated to cost only €11bn more than the original cost of achieving a 20 per cent reduction. In addition, delayed action would come with a high price tag: according to the International Energy Agency, every year of delayed investment on low-carbon energy sources costs €300bn to €400bn at the global level.

Furthermore, these costs were calculated on the conservative assumption that oil will cost $88 (€69, £58) a barrel in 2020. Given the current constraints on supply-side investment, rapid growth in consumption in Asia, and the impact of the Gulf of Mexico oil spill, oil prices may well rise further; under one IEA scenario, the price could reach a nominal $130 a barrel. Rising oil prices would lower the costs of hitting any targets and, under some scenarios, the direct economic effects of hitting the 30 per cent target by 2020 actually turn positive.

Some energy-intensive sectors will be exposed to greater costs than the average. We already try to safeguard them through free emissions allowances where necessary, and alternative measures might be needed over time. The real threat that such industries face, though, is not carbon prices but collapsing demand in the European construction and infrastructure markets. One sure way to increase demand for the materials these sectors produce is through incentives to boost investment in large-scale low-carbon infrastructure – a voracious user of steel, cement, aluminium and chemicals. Our industry departments are working to ensure that we manage the transition effectively and maximise opportunities for these sectors.

Ducking the argument on 30 per cent will put us in the global slow lane. Early action will provide our industries with a vital head start. That is why we believe the move to 30 per cent is right for Europe. It is a policy for jobs and growth, energy security and climate risk. Most of all, it is a policy for Europe’s future.



***************************************************************************
Braidwood commission lawyers refute Taser challenge, CP, July 9 2010.

VANCOUVER — Taser International's legal challenge of the Braidwood commission is not only baseless, but an abuse of process, a provincial government lawyer told a B.C. Supreme Court judge Friday.

Lawyer Craig Jones said the petition by Taser was such a "waste of precious judicial resources" that he may be making the unusual request for the court to award legal costs to the provincial government.

The weapons maker is "manipulating the courts" by saying its stun gun holds no risk of death in Canada, while asserting the reverse in the United States, Jones said in a written submission to the judge.

Earlier in the week, government lawyers pointed to a Taser training bulletin that recommends users aim the device away from the heart to "avoid the remote potential risk of cardiac effect."

But Taser countered that it has never admitted the weapons are dangerous, and that the phrase was simply inserted to prevent potential lawsuits. Jones alleges the Arizona-based company changes its position to suit its local litigation needs.

"The Braidwood Report is making life difficult for Taser -- it finds itself legally compelled to admit to risks it continues to deny in other contexts," the submission states.

"If it can get the report quashed on technical grounds related to procedural fairness its litigation strategy internationally will be advanced and its marketing efforts protected."

Taser is petitioning B.C. Supreme Court to throw out the portion of Commissioner Thomas Braidwood's report about the safety of the stun guns. The retired judge concluded the weapons can kill.

The public inquiry was called in the months after Robert Dziekanski was repeatedly jolted by an RCMP Taser and died on the floor of the Vancouver airport.

Taser's lawyers argued at the start of the hearing that it was treated unfairly in the inquiry, and conclusions were reached that weren't supported by facts.

Jones argued the affidavit shows the company may have asserted it wanted the opportunity to communicate recent research findings, but instead merely intended to protect its own legal position in U.S. litigation.

He argues it "would be a shame" if the conduct of the company passes "without comment or condemnation," given the expense imposed on the B.C. taxpayers. As such, he requests the court "invite submissions on costs" after the judge issues his decision.

Lawyers for all parties wrapped the week of arguments Friday before Judge Robert Sewell, who reserved his ruling without giving a date for his decision.

"I want to thank all counsel for their most thorough, able and interesting submissions," Sewell said when the proceedings had concluded.



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Valentine’s Story, Holy Trinity United Methodist Church, Sunday, January 18 2009.

After a short introduction by Daddy Glenn, I will introduce myself also, and will then answer four questions.

INTRODUCTION:

Hello! Good morning. My name is Valentine Iribagiza. I am happy to be here today to tell you my story. I want to thank Pastor Susan and the Outreach Committee for inviting me here. My English is not good. So I hope you will understand me. The languages that I know best are French, and the native language of Rwanda, called Kinyarwanda.

When I speak to people, I like to answer questions. So today I am going to answer four questions about my life:

1. WHAT HAPPENED IN MY VILLAGE, CALLED NYARUBUYE, IN RWANDA, IN APRIL OF 1994?

In 1994 in Rwanda we had Genocide. The government of Rwanda was controlled by some people from the Hutu majority group who wanted to hold all the power.

The Hutu Power group were prepared to kill those of us who belonged to a group, called the Tutsi.

The Genocide began on April 6th, 1994, when the plane carrying the President of the country, who was a Hutu, was shot down. The President was killed.

The Hutu leaders said that the Tutsi people killed their President, so the killing of Tutsi people began immediately after the President’s plane was shot down.

Many Tutsi people died everywhere – in their homes, along the roads, by the rivers, in the mountains, and also in the churches.

The people of my village, and many other people who were running from the killers, went to the church in our village. We all thought THIS IS THE HOUSE OF GOD and they will not kill us in this church.

After two days, the Hutu killers came to the church and asked who was Hutu and who was Tutsi. The Tutsi people were kept in the church, where most all of them were killed over the next few days. We still do not know the number killed. Even today bodies are still being found buried in our village.

The killers used machetes, bombs, and big clubs with nails. I lost my family, friends, neighbors. I didn’t see my Mom, or my brothers or sisters get killed, but I saw my daddy’s body. The killers kept coming back to the church for three days. Those of us who were not dead pretended to be dead. We hid ourselves among the bodies.

The 2 nd question is: WHAT HAPPENED TO ME AT THAT TIME?

I went to the church with my family on the 12th of April. After two days, the killers came. They struck me with a machete on my hip. They thought I was dead. I was one of the children who hiding among the bodies. I could not walk.

The next day the killers came and threw stones at us to see who was still alive. They found about 10 or 15 of us. They made me crawl out of the church into the churchyard. They called us bad names. Snakes.

A man named Antoine, who was my neighbor, asked me WHY DIDN’T YOU DIE? I said nothing. He asked also WHERE IS YOUR BROTHER? I said nothing. I did not know what happened to my brother.

He had long knife and a club, and he struck me on my right shoulder, and on my head.

Then he made me put my right hand out on the ground, and he struck my hand again and
again with the club.

He thought I was dead, like the others. So the killers went away. It was raining, and I could not stand up, but I managed to crawl back into the church.

I was in the church with all the bodies for some more days when two Hutu people came into the church to see if there were any people still alive. These were people from my village, a brother and a sister. I knew them. They had been among the killers.

They said bad things to me. They called me names. They said we don’t have to kill you. You are going to die anyway.

But then they said, what do you want? I could not speak because my mouth and throat were dry. So I motioned with my hand, asking for water.

They came back later with water, but it was dirty, and I could not drink it. They also brought me a sweet potato. I tried to eat it, but I could not swallow.

Then they went away and never came back.

I was in the church for 43 days without food or water.

The 3 rd question is: HOW DID I SURVIVE AND GET BETTER?

I do not know the answer to this question.

I do not know why I did not die. But maybe God had a plan for me to live.

After being in the church for 43 days, the soldiers came, and a French man named Daniel, and they took me to the hospital.

At the hospital the nurses helped me. They treated my wounds. They gave me a new life.

I was in the hospital for 7 months, and then I was taken to an orphanage. There at the orphanage I saw my younger brother, Placide.

He had survived by running away from the church, and hiding in the bush.

Then our uncle came and found us, and he took us to his home. He and my auntie were like
my mama and papa.

I also met a man named Fergal Keane. He is a reporter for the BBC television company. He had seen me in 1994 when I was badly injured, and started making a video of me.

The video, called VALENTINA’S NIGHTMARE, showed who I was when they found me in May of 1994. It also showed me again in 1997, when Fergal came back, and was surprised to see that I was alive and strong.

When I went back to school I had the idea that one day I would become a soldier. I wanted to be a soldier because it was the soldiers who found me and helped me survive. But then I became afraid that I would be killed if I became a soldier.

So I had the idea of becoming a nun. I wanted to give to God. But I had nothing to give, so I wanted to give myself to God. But my uncle said NO. Finally I had the idea of becoming a nurse, because the nurses had helped me recover from my wounds.

The 4 th question is: WHO AM I TODAY? WHAT ARE MY HOPES AND DREAMS TODAY?

I still want to become a nurse; if not a nurse, then perhaps a counselor. When people ask me, “What do you want to do?” I say, “There is one thing above all. I want to help people. Many people in my country still suffer from TRAUMA. I am strong, so I want to help other people. That is the purpose of my life. TO HELP OTHERS.

In 2003 I met Glenn, who is now like a parent to me. Daddy Glenn helped me come to America, to learn English. I am now studying English at the University of New Hampshire. I hope to start my Bachelor of Arts program next September.

I hope that one day there will be a clinic in Rwanda called Valentine’s Clinic. It will be my gift to the people of my home country. It will help heal people, and also tell about my story.

People ask me if I want to return to Rwanda, and I say “Yes, of course. Rwanda is my home. But I like America too. I like being an international citizen.

Again, thank you for welcoming me to this church. Now that I am here with you, I hope you will call me your daughter. It makes me happy to have many mamas and papas. I like having a big family.

That was my short report. If you have questions, please come to the meeting after the service.



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Testimony of Valentina Izibagiza, SURF.

This is the testimony of Valentina Izibagiza, a survivor of the Rwandan genocide. She was 11 years old in 1994, at the beginning of the Rwandan genocide.

Before the genocide, I lived with my parents, four brothers and three sisters in Kibungo which is near Nyarubuye. We were a happy family and lucky children who didn't want for anything. I was third in the family, and I was in at school in primary three. We are Tutsi and we had many friends and neighbours who were Hutus.

On 7th April, the death of Rwanda's President Habyarimana was announced on the radio which greatly worried my parents. The following days, fires were burning in the neighbourhood, and the army came and killed some Tutsis in the local market place. Then we heard that the killing of Tutsis had begun in Rwanda's capital Kigali. On the 12th April, we heard that one of our Tutsi neighbours was attacked and murdered.

We knew what this meant for us Tutsis. Several people adults went to see the local mayor, Sylvester Gacumbitsi. He was a Hutu mayor but when he advised that Tutsis should go to the Catholic Church for sanctuary, everyone took him at his word. After all this, as my parents told me, this is where Tutsis found sanctuary, in previous attacks, in the 50s, 60s and 70s.

We arrived in the church on the 13th April to find that the priests had left so it was ‘everyone for himself.’ We had no food or water, but at least we had shelter and we were safe. Or so we thought. Now we know that around 3,000 Tutsis sought refuge in this church.

At 3pm on the afternoon of the 15th April we heard the sound of gun shots. Some people ran as soon as they heard the firing, but they were immediately gunned down and killed by the interahamwe, the Hutu militia who were very close. Soon the church was encircled, and the militia was shooting at everyone. Inside the church it was chaos as everyone ran around, screaming, trying to find a place to hide. Originally I'd been with my mother and brother but we became separated in the hysteria which ensued.

The church had lots of little rooms off the main church for storage and for the priests that lived there, so many people hid in here. Just as I'd crouched down in a corner, Gacumbitsi appeared. He had a microphone with him, and he shouted at us, "We are the interahmawe and we're about to eliminate every Tutsi so that in the future no-one will even know what a Tutsi looked like". He added, 'If anyone is hiding in this church because of a mistake, because really he or she is a Hutu, they should tell me now." After a few seconds a boy of about seven or eight stood up. "I am a Hutu," he said. Of course everyone knew that he wasn't Hutu. Two interahmwe soldiers ran forward and beat him with machetes so fiercely that his body went flying up in the air, and came down in several pieces. I sat watching all this terrified, as everyone screamed, begging to be saved.

I'd been hiding in a small cubby hole quite near the entrance of the church. I think it was so small that nobody bothered to check to see if anyone would be hiding there. Sometimes the militia would just take a child and throw it at the wall. Or if they were killing people with machetes they'd throw them so that some fell very close to and almost on top of me as I lay crouched hiding. Towards the end of the day when many people were killed more men came and stuck knives in those who lay wounded to make sure they were dead.

By this time, I was lying underneath several dead people, and they thought that I too was dead. That night all you could hear was people wailing. The survivors wandered around discovering who was dead and who the killers hadn't quite managed to kill. I crawled out from beneath some dead bodies, and tried to find my parents but I couldn't find anyone from my family. The next day, the killers returned and the same slaughter happened all over again. It's impossible to tell you how terrible it was.

Three days after the first killing had begun, on 16th April, another group of killers came, this time led by Antoine who had been our neighbour and a friend of our family. As Antoine and his companions passed me by, I held my breath. Later that day, when it seemed that almost everyone was dead, the interahamwe brought their dogs which began eating the dead. That was horrible. When the dogs came near me, I swiped at them and they went off to someone else. But some soldiers walked around checking exactly who was left, and they dragged out 15 people including me.

I knew one of the soldiers, whose name was Fredina. I begged him, "Can you find it in your heart to forgive me for being Tutsi? Please spare me." He spat at me, and said "Is this a hospital that I should forgive you? But I'm not going to smear myself with your blood. I'm going to ask someone else to kill you." He gestured to Antoine, our other neighbour.

"I'm going to kill you," he said, and I put up my hand to protect my head from his machete. Then he began smashing my hands with a clubbed stick, so that my fingers were broken and my skull was bleeding and the pain was terrible. After that he beat me some more on my shoulders and then again on my head, which was agonising and soon the pain was so terrible, that I knew no more. I had passed out.

I stayed among the dead in the Church at Nyarubuye for 43 days without food and only holy water or rain water. Now I'm not sure how I survived. I do remember that in the first few days I was in terrible pain, from the wounds on my head, but then I became like a log; it was as if I couldn't feel and I could barely move, except to crawl out to drink rain water.

During those days, the dogs would come round to eat people, but they became scared of me, so they never came into the room where I lay.

On the 26th May a man appeared who lived near the church. His name I now know was Caliste and when he caught sight of me, he wasn't sure whether I was dead or alive. He brought some food and threw it to me, and then he returned with a white journalist, a mzungo. He was a Frenchmen who'd been making a documentary, about the genocide and he'd been filming all the dead bodies at what I later learnt was the massacre of Nyarubuye when 3,000 people were killed.

Now I am 19, but I feel a lot older. I live with a cousin, who had gone to Kenya, before the war, but now he's returned, and I'm studying at school. Now the church at Nyarubuye has gone back to being a proper church, and I took part in Fergal Keane's film when he returned to find out what had happened to the survivors.

Last summer I went to Arusha to testify at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), where I could see Gacumbitsi. I knew him but of course he didn't know me. He looked fat and healthy and he wore a smart suit with a tie, and he looked contented. I was terrified, and then I felt very angry. That gave me the courage to speak and tell my story. He didn't seem remotely concerned at what I had to say. Then his lawyer asked me questions which made me both scared and furious. What right had they to question my credibility in this way, after what I had suffered? My testimony at the international court brought me no relief. All it did was to make me relive the horror. To me it didn't feel like justice; it just made me relive the horror of what happened in the Church at Nyarubuye.

ENDS

Sunday, 14 March 2010

collapse

Up, Down.

"Rather, empires behave like all complex adaptive systems. They function in apparent equilibrium for some unknowable period. And then, quite abruptly, they collapse."
     Niall Ferguson, Complexity and Collapse - Empires on the Edge of Chaos
     Foreign Affairs March/April 2010.
Montparnasse Train Wreck 1895Montparnasse Train Wreck 1895
I have also received Colin Turnbull's The Mountain People ... not a pleasant prospect this coming collapse eh? ... grim ... maybe it was a mistake to know about the controversy before I read the book, and another strange misunderstanding too - for some reason I had the publication date in my mind sometime late 40s, but it was 1972 (?) - the preface seemed ok but as I got into it the descriptive logic seemed more-and-more sketchy, as if the man had something serious to prove ... now I will have to go back to the controversy and look for another view

and there's Agathe Habyarimana aka Agathe Kanziga, wife/widow of Juvénal Habyarimana, the president of Rwanda assassinated on April 6, 1994 - marking the date of the official beginning of the Rwanda genocide, it looks like she had to know he was about to be killed (?) ... a story with wrinkles ...
Rwanda Agathe HabyarimanaRwanda Agathe HabyarimanaRwanda Agathe HabyarimanaRwanda Agathe HabyarimanaRwanda Agathe HabyarimanaRwanda Agathe HabyarimanaRwanda Agathe HabyarimanaRwanda Agathe Habyarimana
and what about Belgian Colonel Luc Marchal? what about Agathe Uwilingiyimana and her husband (who does not seem to have a name)?

Florida Mukeshimana-NgulinziraFlorida Mukeshimana-Ngulinzirawhat about Foreign Minister Boniface Ngulinzira and his widow Florida Mukeshimana-Ngulinzira? is that the ghost of a smile on her lips?

Preacher was a talkin’, there’s a sermon he gave, he said every man’s conscience is vile and depraved, you cannot depend on it to be your guide when it’s you who must keep it satisfied.
     Bob Dylan, Man In The Long Black Coat.

then I came across two thoughts on rules ... sort of ... Learning From Lehman, a NYT Editorial, and Nascar’s 190-M.P.H. Beanball, by a 'historian' named Daniel Pierce, a 'perfect storm' of misalignment, misinformation, Frye's (now, for me, proverbial) "A kernel of truth in a bushel of vicious nonsense." (The Double Vision)

Pearls Before SwinePearls Before Swine

Appendices:
1. Complexity and Collapse - Empires on the Edge of Chaos, Niall Ferguson, Foreign Affairs March/April 2010.
2. Learning From Lehman, NYT Editorial, Mar 13 2010.
3. Nascar’s 190-M.P.H. Beanball, Daniel Pierce, Mar 13 2010.




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Complexity and Collapse - Empires on the Edge of Chaos, Niall Ferguson, Foreign Affairs March/April 2010.

Summary: Imperial collapse may come much more suddenly than many historians imagine. A combination of fiscal deficits and military overstretch suggests that the United States may be the next empire on the precipice.

NIALL FERGUSON is Laurence A. Tisch Professor of History at Harvard University, a Fellow at Jesus College, Oxford, and a Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University. His most recent book is The Ascent of Money: A Financial History of the World.

There is no better illustration of the life cycle of a great power than The Course of Empire, a series of five paintings by Thomas Cole that hang in the New-York Historical Society. Cole was a founder of the Hudson River School and one of the pioneers of nineteenth-century American landscape painting; in The Course of Empire, he beautifully captured a theory of imperial rise and fall to which most people remain in thrall to this day.

Each of the five imagined scenes depicts the mouth of a great river beneath a rocky outcrop. In the first, The Savage State, a lush wilderness is populated by a handful of hunter-gatherers eking out a primitive existence at the break of a stormy dawn. The second picture, The Arcadian or Pastoral State, is of an agrarian idyll: the inhabitants have cleared the trees, planted fields, and built an elegant Greek temple. The third and largest of the paintings is The Consummation of Empire. Now, the landscape is covered by a magnificent marble entrepôt, and the contented farmer-philosophers of the previous tableau have been replaced by a throng of opulently clad merchants, proconsuls, and citizen-consumers. It is midday in the life cycle. Then comes Destruction. The city is ablaze, its citizens fleeing an invading horde that rapes and pillages beneath a brooding evening sky. Finally, the moon rises over the fifth painting, Desolation. There is not a living soul to be seen, only a few decaying columns and colonnades overgrown by briars and ivy.

Thomas Cole The Savage State

Conceived in the mid-1830s, Cole's great pentaptych has a clear message: all empires, no matter how magnificent, are condemned to decline and fall. The implicit suggestion was that the young American republic of Cole's age would be better served by sticking to its bucolic first principles and resisting the imperial temptations of commerce, conquest, and colonization.

For centuries, historians, political theorists, anthropologists, and the public at large have tended to think about empires in such cyclical and gradual terms. "The best instituted governments," the British political philosopher Henry St. John, First Viscount Bolingbroke, wrote in 1738, "carry in them the seeds of their destruction: and, though they grow and improve for a time, they will soon tend visibly to their dissolution. Every hour they live is an hour the less that they have to live."

Idealists and materialists alike have shared that assumption. In his book Scienza nuova, the Italian philosopher Giambattista Vico describes all civilizations as passing through three phases: the divine, the heroic, and the human, finally dissolving into what Vico called "the barbarism of reflection." For Hegel and Marx, it was the dialectic that gave history its unmistakable beat. History was seasonal for Oswald Spengler, the German historian, who wrote in his 1918-22 book, The Decline of the West, that the nineteenth century had been "the winter of the West, the victory of materialism and skepticism, of socialism, parliamentarianism, and money." The British historian Arnold Toynbee's universal theory of civilization proposed a cycle of challenge, response, and suicide. Each of these models is different, but all share the idea that history has rhythm.

Although hardly anyone reads Spengler or Toynbee today, similar strains of thought are visible in contemporary bestsellers. Paul Kennedy's The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers is another work of cyclical history -- despite its profusion of statistical tables, which at first sight make it seem the very antithesis of Spenglerian grand theory. In Kennedy's model, great powers rise and fall according to the growth rates of their industrial bases and the costs of their imperial commitments relative to their GDPs. Just as in Cole's The Course of Empire, imperial expansion carries the seeds of future decline. As Kennedy writes, "If a state overextends itself strategically ... it runs the risk that the potential benefits from external expansion may be outweighed by the great expense of it all." This phenomenon of "imperial overstretch," Kennedy argues, is common to all great powers. In 1987, when Kennedy's book was published, the United States worried that it might be succumbing to this disease. Just because the Soviet Union fell first did not necessarily invalidate the hypothesis.

More recently, it is Jared Diamond, an anthropologist, who has captured the public imagination with a grand theory of rise and fall. His 2005 book, Collapse: How Societies Choose to Fail or Succeed, is cyclical history for the so-called Green Age: tales of past societies, from seventeenth-century Easter Island to twenty-first-century China, that risked, or now risk, destroying themselves by abusing their natural environments. Diamond quotes John Lloyd Stevens, the American explorer and amateur archaeologist who discovered the eerily dead Mayan cities of Mexico: "Here were the remains of a cultivated, polished, and peculiar people, who had passed through all the stages incident to the rise and fall of nations, reached their golden age, and perished." According to Diamond, the Maya fell into a classic Malthusian trap as their population grew larger than their fragile and inefficient agricultural system could support. More people meant more cultivation, but more cultivation meant deforestation, erosion, drought, and soil exhaustion. The result was civil war over dwindling resources and, finally, collapse.

Diamond's warning is that today's world could go the way of the Maya. This is an important message, no doubt. But in reviving the cyclical theory of history, Collapse reproduces an old conceptual defect. Diamond makes the mistake of focusing on what historians of the French Annales school called la longue durée, the long term. No matter whether civilizations commit suicide culturally, economically, or ecologically, the downfall is very protracted. Just as it takes centuries for imperial overstretch to undermine a great power, so, too, does it take centuries to wreck an ecosystem. As Diamond points out, political leaders in almost any society -- primitive or sophisticated -- have little incentive to address problems that are unlikely to manifest themselves for a hundred years or more.

Thomas Cole The Arcadian or Pastoral State

Did the proconsuls in Cole's The Consummation of Empire really care if the fate of their great-great-grandchildren was destruction? No. Would they have accepted a tax increase that would have financed a preemptive strike against the next millennium's barbarian horde? Again, no. As the UN Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen last December made clear, rhetorical pleas to save the planet for future generations are insufficient to overcome the conflicts over economic distribution between rich and poor countries that exist in the here and now.

The current economic challenges facing the United States are also often represented as long-term threats. It is the slow march of demographics -- which is driving up the ratio of retirees to workers -- and not current policy, that condemns the public finances of the United States to sink deeper into the red. According to the Congressional Budget Office's "alternative fiscal scenario," which takes into account likely changes in government policy, public debt could rise from 44 percent before the financial crisis to a staggering 716 percent by 2080. In its "extended-baseline scenario," which assumes current policies will remain the same, the figure is closer to 280 percent. It hardly seems to matter which number is correct. Is there a single member of Congress who is willing to cut entitlements or increase taxes in order to avert a crisis that will culminate only when today's babies are retirees?

Similarly, when it comes to the global economy, the wheel of history seems to revolve slowly, like an old water mill in high summer. Some projections suggest that China's GDP will overtake the United States' GDP in 2027; others say that this will not happen until 2040. By 2050, India's economy will supposedly catch up with that of the United States, too. But to many, these great changes in the balance of economic power seem very remote compared with the timeframe for the deployment of U.S. soldiers to Afghanistan and then their withdrawal, for which the unit of account is months, not years, much less decades.

Yet it is possible that this whole conceptual framework is, in fact, flawed. Perhaps Cole's artistic representation of imperial birth, growth, and eventual death is a misrepresentation of the historical process. What if history is not cyclical and slow moving but arrhythmic -- at times almost stationary, but also capable of accelerating suddenly, like a sports car? What if collapse does not arrive over a number of centuries but comes suddenly, like a thief in the night?

WHEN GOOD SYSTEMS GO BAD

Great powers and empires are, I would suggest, complex systems, made up of a very large number of interacting components that are asymmetrically organized, which means their construction more resembles a termite hill than an Egyptian pyramid. They operate somewhere between order and disorder -- on "the edge of chaos," in the phrase of the computer scientist Christopher Langton. Such systems can appear to operate quite stably for some time; they seem to be in equilibrium but are, in fact, constantly adapting. But there comes a moment when complex systems "go critical." A very small trigger can set off a "phase transition" from a benign equilibrium to a crisis -- a single grain of sand causes a whole pile to collapse, or a butterfly flaps its wings in the Amazon and brings about a hurricane in southeastern England.

Not long after such crises happen, historians arrive on the scene. They are the scholars who specialize in the study of "fat tail" events -- the low-frequency, high-impact moments that inhabit the tails of probability distributions, such as wars, revolutions, financial crashes, and imperial collapses. But historians often misunderstand complexity in decoding these events. They are trained to explain calamity in terms of long-term causes, often dating back decades. This is what Nassim Taleb rightly condemned in The Black Swan as "the narrative fallacy": the construction of psychologically satisfying stories on the principle of post hoc, ergo propter hoc.

Drawing casual inferences about causation is an age-old habit. Take World War I. A huge war breaks out in the summer of 1914, to the great surprise of nearly everyone. Before long, historians have devised a story line commensurate with the disaster: a treaty governing the neutrality of Belgium that was signed in 1839, the waning of Ottoman power in the Balkans dating back to the 1870s, and malevolent Germans and the navy they began building in 1897. A contemporary version of this fallacy traces the 9/11 attacks back to the Egyptian government's 1966 execution of Sayyid Qutb, the Islamist writer who inspired the Muslim Brotherhood. Most recently, the financial crisis that began in 2007 has been attributed to measures of financial deregulation taken in the United States in the 1980s.

Thomas Cole The Consummation of Empire

In reality, the proximate triggers of a crisis are often sufficient to explain the sudden shift from a good equilibrium to a bad mess. Thus, World War I was actually caused by a series of diplomatic miscalculations in the summer of 1914, the real origins of 9/11 lie in the politics of Saudi Arabia in the 1990s, and the financial crisis was principally due to errors in monetary policy by the U.S. Federal Reserve and to China's rapid accumulation of dollar reserves after 2001. Most of the fat-tail phenomena that historians study are not the climaxes of prolonged and deterministic story lines; instead, they represent perturbations, and sometimes the complete breakdowns, of complex systems.

To understand complexity, it is helpful to examine how natural scientists use the concept. Think of the spontaneous organization of half a million ants or termites, which allows them to construct complex hills and nests, or the fractal geometry of water molecules as they form intricate snowflakes. Human intelligence itself is a complex system, a product of the interaction of billions of neurons in the central nervous system, or what Charles Sherrington, the pioneering neuroscientist, called "an enchanted loom."

The political and economic structures made by humans share many of the features of complex adaptive systems. Heterodox economists such as W. Brian Arthur have been arguing along these lines for decades. To Arthur, a complex economy is characterized by the interaction of dispersed agents, a lack of central control, multiple levels of organization, continual adaptation, incessant creation of new market niches, and the absence of general equilibrium. This conception of economics goes beyond both Adam Smith's hallowed idea that an "invisible hand" causes markets to work through the interactions of profit-maximizing individuals and Friedrich von Hayek's critique of economic planning and demand management. In contradiction to the classic economic prediction that competition causes diminishing returns, a complex economy makes increasing returns possible. In this version of economics, Silicon Valley is a complex adaptive system; so is the Internet itself.

Researchers at the Santa Fe Institute, a nonprofit center devoted to the study of complex systems, are currently looking at how such insights can be applied to other aspects of collective human activity, including international relations. This effort may recall the futile struggle of Edward Casaubon to find "the key to all mythologies" in George Eliot's novel Middlemarch. But the attempt is worthwhile, because an understanding of how complex systems function is an essential part of any strategy to anticipate and delay their failure.

Whether the canopy of a rain forest or the trading floor of Wall Street, complex systems share certain characteristics. A small input to such a system can produce huge, often unanticipated changes -- what scientists call "the amplifier effect." A vaccine, for example, stimulates the immune system to become resistant to, say, measles or mumps. But administer too large a dose, and the patient dies. Meanwhile, causal relationships are often nonlinear, which means that traditional methods of generalizing through observation (such as trend analysis and sampling) are of little use. Some theorists of complexity would go so far as to say that complex systems are wholly nondeterministic, meaning that it is impossible to make predictions about their future behavior based on existing data.

When things go wrong in a complex system, the scale of disruption is nearly impossible to anticipate. There is no such thing as a typical or average forest fire, for example. To use the jargon of modern physics, a forest before a fire is in a state of "self-organized criticality": it is teetering on the verge of a breakdown, but the size of the breakdown is unknown. Will there be a small fire or a huge one? It is very hard to say: a forest fire twice as large as last year's is roughly four or six or eight times less likely to happen this year. This kind of pattern -- known as a "power-law distribution" -- is remarkably common in the natural world. It can be seen not just in forest fires but also in earthquakes and epidemics. Some researchers claim that conflicts follow a similar pattern, ranging from local skirmishes to full-scale world wars.

What matters most is that in such systems a relatively minor shock can cause a disproportionate -- and sometimes fatal -- disruption. As Taleb has argued, by 2007, the global economy had grown to resemble an over-optimized electrical grid. Defaults on subprime mortgages produced a relatively small surge in the United States that tipped the entire world economy into a financial blackout, which, for a moment, threatened to bring about a complete collapse of international trade. But blaming such a crash on a policy of deregulation under U.S. President Ronald Reagan is about as plausible as blaming World War I on the buildup of the German navy under Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz.

Thomas Cole Destruction

EMPIRE STATE OF MIND

Regardless of whether it is a dictatorship or a democracy, any large-scale political unit is a complex system. Most great empires have a nominal central authority -- either a hereditary emperor or an elected president -- but in practice the power of any individual ruler is a function of the network of economic, social, and political relations over which he or she presides. As such, empires exhibit many of the characteristics of other complex adaptive systems -- including the tendency to move from stability to instability quite suddenly. But this fact is rarely recognized because of the collective addiction to cyclical theories of history.

Perhaps the most famous story of imperial decline is that of ancient Rome. In The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, published in six volumes between 1776 and 1788, Edward Gibbon covered more than 1,400 years of history, from 180 to 1590. This was history over the very long run, in which the causes of decline ranged from the personality disorders of individual emperors to the power of the Praetorian Guard and the rise of monotheism. After the death of Marcus Aurelius in 180, civil war became a recurring problem, as aspiring emperors competed for the spoils of supreme power. By the fourth century, barbarian invasions or migrations were well under way and only intensified as the Huns moved west. Meanwhile, the challenge posed by Sassanid Persia to the Eastern Roman Empire was steadily growing.

But what if fourth-century Rome was simply functioning normally as a complex adaptive system, with political strife, barbarian migration, and imperial rivalry all just integral features of late antiquity? Through this lens, Rome's fall was sudden and dramatic -- just as one would expect when such a system goes critical. As the Oxford historians Peter Heather and Bryan Ward-Perkins have argued, the final breakdown in the Western Roman Empire began in 406, when Germanic invaders poured across the Rhine into Gaul and then Italy. Rome itself was sacked by the Goths in 410. Co-opted by an enfeebled emperor, the Goths then fought the Vandals for control of Spain, but this merely shifted the problem south. Between 429 and 439, Genseric led the Vandals to victory after victory in North Africa, culminating in the fall of Carthage. Rome lost its southern Mediterranean breadbasket and, along with it, a huge source of tax revenue. Roman soldiers were just barely able to defeat Attila's Huns as they swept west from the Balkans. By 452, the Western Roman Empire had lost all of Britain, most of Spain, the richest provinces of North Africa, and southwestern and southeastern Gaul. Not much was left besides Italy. Basiliscus, brother-in-law of Emperor Leo I, tried and failed to recapture Carthage in 468. Byzantium lived on, but the Western Roman Empire was dead. By 476, Rome was the fiefdom of Odoacer, king of the Goths.

What is most striking about this history is the speed of the Roman Empire's collapse. In just five decades, the population of Rome itself fell by three-quarters. Archaeological evidence from the late fifth century -- inferior housing, more primitive pottery, fewer coins, smaller cattle -- shows that the benign influence of Rome diminished rapidly in the rest of western Europe. What Ward-Perkins calls "the end of civilization" came within the span of a single generation.

Other great empires have suffered comparably swift collapses. The Ming dynasty in China began in 1368, when the warlord Zhu Yuanzhang renamed himself Emperor Hongwu, the word hongwu meaning "vast military power." For most of the next three centuries, Ming China was the world's most sophisticated civilization by almost any measure. Then, in the mid-seventeenth century, political factionalism, fiscal crisis, famine, and epidemic disease opened the door to rebellion within and incursions from without. In 1636, the Manchu leader Huang Taiji proclaimed the advent of the Qing dynasty. Just eight years later, Beijing, the magnificent Ming capital, fell to the rebel leader Li Zicheng, and the last Ming emperor hanged himself out of shame. The transition from Confucian equipoise to anarchy took little more than a decade.

In much the same way, the Bourbon monarchy in France passed from triumph to terror with astonishing rapidity. French intervention on the side of the colonial rebels against British rule in North America in the 1770s seemed like a good idea at the time -- a chance for revenge after Great Britain's victory in the Seven Years' War a decade earlier -- but it served to tip French finances into a critical state. In May 1789, the summoning of the Estates-General, France's long-dormant representative assembly, unleashed a political chain reaction that led to a swift collapse of royal legitimacy in France. Only four years later, in January 1793, Louis XVI was decapitated by guillotine.

Thomas Cole Desolation

Although several narrative fallacies suggest that the Hapsburg, Ottoman, and Romanov empires were doomed for decades before World War I, the disintegration of the dynastic land empires of eastern Europe came with equal swiftness. What was impressive, in fact, was how well these ancient empires were able to withstand the test of total war. Their collapse only began with the Bolshevik Revolution of October 1917. A mere five years later, Mehmed VI, the last sultan of the Ottoman Empire, departed Constantinople aboard a British warship. With that, all three dynasties were defunct.

The sun set on the British Empire almost as suddenly. In February 1945, Prime Minister Winston Churchill was at Yalta, dividing up the world with U.S. President Franklin Roosevelt and Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin. As World War II was ending, he was swept from office in the July 1945 general election. Within a decade, the United Kingdom had conceded independence to Bangladesh, Bhutan, Burma, Egypt, Eritrea, India, Iran, Israel, Jordan, Libya, Madagascar, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. The Suez crisis in 1956 proved that the United Kingdom could not act in defiance of the United States in the Middle East, setting the seal on the end of empire. Although it took until the 1960s for independence to reach sub-Saharan Africa and the remnants of colonial rule east of the Suez, the United Kingdom's age of hegemony was effectively over less than a dozen years after its victories over Germany and Japan.

The most recent and familiar example of precipitous decline is, of course, the collapse of the Soviet Union. With the benefit of hindsight, historians have traced all kinds of rot within the Soviet system back to the Brezhnev era and beyond. Perhaps, as the historian and political scientist Stephen Kotkin has argued, it was only the high oil prices of the 1970s that "averted Armageddon." But this did not seem to be the case at the time. In March 1985, when Mikhail Gorbachev became general secretary of the Soviet Communist Party, the CIA estimated the Soviet economy to be approximately 60 percent the size of the U.S. economy. This estimate is now known to have been wrong, but the Soviet nuclear arsenal was genuinely larger than the U.S. stockpile. And governments in what was then called the Third World, from Vietnam to Nicaragua, had been tilting in the Soviets' favor for most of the previous 20 years. Yet less than five years after Gorbachev took power, the Soviet imperium in central and Eastern Europe had fallen apart, followed by the Soviet Union itself in 1991. If ever an empire fell off a cliff -- rather than gently declining -- it was the one founded by Lenin.

OVER THE EDGE

If empires are complex systems that sooner or later succumb to sudden and catastrophic malfunctions, rather than cycling sedately from Arcadia to Apogee to Armageddon, what are the implications for the United States today? First, debating the stages of decline may be a waste of time -- it is a precipitous and unexpected fall that should most concern policymakers and citizens. Second, most imperial falls are associated with fiscal crises. All the above cases were marked by sharp imbalances between revenues and expenditures, as well as difficulties with financing public debt. Alarm bells should therefore be ringing very loudly, indeed, as the United States contemplates a deficit for 2009 of more than $1.4 trillion -- about 11.2 percent of GDP, the biggest deficit in 60 years -- and another for 2010 that will not be much smaller. Public debt, meanwhile, is set to more than double in the coming decade, from $5.8 trillion in 2008 to $14.3 trillion in 2019. Within the same timeframe, interest payments on that debt are forecast to leap from eight percent of federal revenues to 17 percent.

These numbers are bad, but in the realm of political entities, the role of perception is just as crucial, if not more so. In imperial crises, it is not the material underpinnings of power that really matter but expectations about future power. The fiscal numbers cited above cannot erode U.S. strength on their own, but they can work to weaken a long-assumed faith in the United States' ability to weather any crisis. For now, the world still expects the United States to muddle through, eventually confronting its problems when, as Churchill famously said, all the alternatives have been exhausted. Through this lens, past alarms about the deficit seem overblown, and 2080 -- when the U.S. debt may reach staggering proportions -- seems a long way off, leaving plenty of time to plug the fiscal hole. But one day, a seemingly random piece of bad news -- perhaps a negative report by a rating agency -- will make the headlines during an otherwise quiet news cycle. Suddenly, it will be not just a few policy wonks who worry about the sustainability of U.S. fiscal policy but also the public at large, not to mention investors abroad. It is this shift that is crucial: a complex adaptive system is in big trouble when its component parts lose faith in its viability.

Over the last three years, the complex system of the global economy flipped from boom to bust -- all because a bunch of Americans started to default on their subprime mortgages, thereby blowing huge holes in the business models of thousands of highly leveraged financial institutions. The next phase of the current crisis may begin when the public begins to reassess the credibility of the monetary and fiscal measures that the Obama administration has taken in response. Neither interest rates at zero nor fiscal stimulus can achieve a sustainable recovery if people in the United States and abroad collectively decide, overnight, that such measures will lead to much higher inflation rates or outright default. As Thomas Sargent, an economist who pioneered the idea of rational expectations, demonstrated more than 20 years ago, such decisions are self-fulfilling: it is not the base supply of money that determines inflation but the velocity of its circulation, which in turn is a function of expectations. In the same way, it is not the debt-to-GDP ratio that determines government solvency but the interest rate that investors demand. Bond yields can shoot up if expectations change about future government solvency, intensifying an already bad fiscal crisis by driving up the cost of interest payments on new debt. Just ask Greece -- it happened there at the end of last year, plunging the country into fiscal and political crisis.

Finally, a shift in expectations about monetary and fiscal policy could force a reassessment of future U.S. foreign policy. There is a zero-sum game at the heart of the budgetary process: if interest payments consume a rising proportion of tax revenue, military expenditure is the item most likely to be cut because, unlike mandatory entitlements, it is discretionary. A U.S. president who says he will deploy 30,000 additional troops to Afghanistan and then, in 18 months' time, start withdrawing them again already has something of a credibility problem. And what about the United States' other strategic challenges? For the United States' enemies in Iran and Iraq, it must be consoling to know that U.S. fiscal policy today is preprogrammed to reduce the resources available for all overseas military operations in the years ahead.

Defeat in the mountains of the Hindu Kush or on the plains of Mesopotamia has long been a harbinger of imperial fall. It is no coincidence that the Soviet Union withdrew from Afghanistan in the annus mirabilis of 1989. What happened 20 years ago, like the events of the distant fifth century, is a reminder that empires do not in fact appear, rise, reign, decline, and fall according to some recurrent and predictable life cycle. It is historians who retrospectively portray the process of imperial dissolution as slow-acting, with multiple overdetermining causes. Rather, empires behave like all complex adaptive systems. They function in apparent equilibrium for some unknowable period. And then, quite abruptly, they collapse. To return to the terminology of Thomas Cole, the painter of The Course of Empire, the shift from consummation to destruction and then to desolation is not cyclical. It is sudden.

A more appropriate visual representation of the way complex systems collapse may be the old poster, once so popular in thousands of college dorm rooms, of a runaway steam train that has crashed through the wall of a Victorian railway terminus and hit the street below nose first. A defective brake or a sleeping driver can be all it takes to go over the edge of chaos.




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Learning From Lehman, NYT Editorial, Mar 13 2010.

On top of everything Lehman Brothers did before it collapsed in 2008, nearly toppling the financial system, it now seems that it was aggressively massaging its books.

Of course, many colossal bankruptcies involve bad accounting. But a new report on the Lehman collapse, released last week and described in an article in Friday’s Times, would leave anyone dumbstruck by the firm’s audacity — and reminded of the crying need for adult supervision of Wall Street.

The 2,200-page report was written by Anton R. Valukas, a former federal prosecutor who was appointed by the Justice Department as an examiner for the Lehman bankruptcy case. According to the report, Lehman engaged in transactions that let it temporarily shift troubled assets off its books and in so doing, hide its reliance on borrowed money.

The maneuvers, which Mr. Valukas said were “materially misleading,” made the firm appear healthier than it was. He wrote that Richard S. Fuld Jr., Lehman’s former chief executive, was “at least grossly negligent,” and that Lehman executives engaged in “actionable balance sheet manipulation.”

At the time, one Lehman executive sent e-mail to a colleague describing the accounting ploys as “basically window dressing.”

Window dressing? Shortly before Lehman’s failure, $50 billion in troubled assets were shed from its balance sheet.

The executive who got the e-mail almost manages a question: “So it’s legally do-able but doesn’t look good when we actually do it?” — followed by that familiar dodge: “Does the rest of the street do it?”

Surely those whose job it is to analyze and supervise were alarmed, weren’t they? According to the report, rating agencies, government regulators and Lehman’s board of directors had no clue about the gimmicks. The result is that we were all blindsided. And we could be blindsided again. Congress is not even close to passing meaningful regulatory reform. The surviving banks have only gotten bigger and more politically powerful. If the Valukas report is not a wake-up call, what would be?



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Nascar’s 190-M.P.H. Beanball, Daniel Pierce, Mar 13 2010.

Daniel S. Pierce is the chairman of the history department at the University of North Carolina, Asheville, and author of “Real Nascar: White Lightning, Red Clay and Big Bill France.”

Asheville, N.C. - LAST Sunday the Nascar driver Carl Edwards drove his Ford into Brad Keselowski’s Dodge as the two raced around the Atlanta Motor Speedway at 190 miles per hour. Keselowski’s car flew into the air and crashed into the wall along the track’s front stretch.

Wrecks are nothing new in Nascar. But usually they’re accidents. This time, though, Edwards unapologetically admitted that he wrecked his rival in retaliation for an incident last year in Talladega, Ala., where Keselowski knocked Edwards’s car into the fence and out of the race.

What’s surprising is that this was no surprise. In January, Nascar’s vice president for competition, Robin Pemberton, had in effect given approval to such rough racing when he announced that the Daytona brass were loosening the reins on driver behavior on and off the track. “Boys, have at it and have a good time,” he said.

The slap-on-the-wrist penalty that Edwards received for hitting Keselowski confirmed that, at least for now, Nascar is planning to let drivers police themselves.

This has left a lot of people shocked — and brought the sport a flood of news media attention. For many non-fans, it seems proof that Nascar is a violent activity for aggressive rednecks.

But the truth is quite different. Nascar — like almost all sports, particularly at the professional level — has an unwritten code of social behavior. And when that code is violated, there are consequences. The new rules simply let that code take its full effect.

Think of it this way: Baseball has plunking and we have, well, crashing. After all, Edwards’s retaliatory wrecking of Keselowski was not much different from the Giants’ Barry Zito plunking the Brewers’ Prince Fielder in the back with a pitch the other day, six months after Fielder had embarrassed the Giants with an ostentatious home-run celebration.

Indeed, the new rules simply take Nascar back to its roots. Edwards’s move was part of the sport’s tradition, as old as stock-car racing itself, and as much a part of its DNA as moonshine, street racing and red-dirt tracks. Stock-car racing’s passionate following was built on drivers “cuttin’ ’em a flip” on the track and fighting it out afterward in the infield.

Longtime fans have great memories of incidents like the 10-lap demolition derby that took place at Bowman Gray Stadium in Winston-Salem, N.C., in 1966, when Curtis Turner and Bobby Allison “got into it” and repeatedly rammed each other until their cars died.

Most historians point to the 1979 Daytona 500 as the moment Nascar began to capture the nation’s eye. But that attention came not from Richard Petty winning the race, but from Donnie Allison and Cale Yarborough battling for the lead on the final lap and then duking it out in the infield after their cars slid to a stop, all on national television.

Given the traditions of the sport, while Keselowski probably deserved a plunking, what Edwards delivered was more akin to a beanball to the head — too dangerous and beyond the boundaries of a proper retaliatory response.

However, don’t be surprised if Edwards puts Keselowski into the wall — or vice versa — next week at Bristol Motor Speedway in Tennessee or in two weeks at the Martinsville Speedway in Virginia, where the cars don’t reach such high speeds and the dangers of seriously injuring either a driver or a fan are not so high.

This might look like barbarity in steel-and-glass form. But it’s not. Stock-car racing isn’t simply about speed; it is an intricate dance of complex strategies and fearless maneuvering.

At 200 miles per hour, there are no referees to call foul; the only effective arbiter, at least during the race, is the unwritten code of the drivers themselves. Nascar’s new rules are simply the wise recognition of that fact.