Monday, 6 April 2009

Susan Drummond, Polygamy, Correctitude

Up, Down.

Got interested in this woman last year when she published an opinion piece in the Globe, You really want them all charged? (below). What piqued my curiosity at the time was her forthright revelation of personal history: "Without going into details, two years after my separation, I entered another 'conjugal union' with my partner of the last seven years," and so on. Not deeply personal, but deeper than expected - and it revealed another trait viz. (at least apparently) operating out of your own reality rather than some theoretical ideology. And today she published another ... so here they are.

Susan DrummondSusan DrummondSusan Drummond

What adds to my interest is thinking of this person operating within (what I imagine to be) the fairly stupid intellectual environment at York University - hanging out with wazzername ... Gillary Massa and such like ... either face-to-face with correctitude, or somehow coexisting with it. Who knows? Some of the commenters on her latest Globe piece were suggesting (if you can call mindless ranting a suggestion) that she is one of these correct nitwits ... could be I guess ... can't say yet ... the pictures I could find of her and her use of mealy mouthed terms such as 'conjugal union' and 'partner' notwithstanding ... reminds me of Frye's quip, "If I were a primrose by a river's brim, I should feel insulted," in reference to Wordsworth's poem.

Anyway ... four articles in the Globe reproduced below, and two books: Incorporating the Familiar, at the publisher's site, McGill-Queen's University Press (MQUP), and (sort of) at Google Books, and,
Mapping Marriage Law in Spanish Gitano Communities, at the publisher's site, University of British Columbia Press (UBCPress), and at Google Books (not!).

I have ordered the books and will report later. Anyone needing insight into what Google is really good for can follow the links to the Google Book versions above. A joke, a bad joke ... I wish someone clever would hack their server and put it all out on uTorrent ...

Also remembering slurs from my days at McGill ... JAP, Jewish American Princess ... goes to show that nothing is ever fixed, nothing is ever gotten over, nothing overcome or sorted out ... the waste-bin you drag along and rediscover at your side again and again like Peer Gynt's troll child ... abiding proof that you have messed intimitely with ugliness at least once.



Appendices:
1. Short Bio on Osgoode/York site.
2. Not just Muslim women are exploited by 'religious' law, September 9, 2005.
3. Beyond cartoons, February 11, 2006.
4. You really want them all charged?, August 5, 2008.
5. A marriage of fear and xenophobia, April 6, 2009.


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Short Bio on Osgoode/York site.

BA, BSW (Dalhousie), BCL, LLB, MSW (McGill), DEA (Aix Marseille) DCL (McGill)

Associate Professor Susan Drummond joined Osgoode’s faculty in 1999, and specializes in the areas of legal anthropology, comparative law, civil law, and family law. She was the first student in Canada to graduate with both a civil and common law degree as well as a Master's in Social Work. Her BA in philosophy and her postgraduate Diplôme d'Etudes Approfondies from the Université d'Aix-Marseille, specializing in legal theory and legal anthropology, make her a truly interdisciplinary scholar. She has published two books, Incorporating the Familiar: An Investigation into Legal Sensibilities in Nunavik, based on her undergraduate fieldwork in Inuit communities in northern Quebec, and Mapping Marriage Law in Spanish Gitano Communities,which won the Canadian Law and Society Association/Association canadienne droit et société 2006 Book Prize.

Areas of Interest: Family Law, Legal Theory, Comparative Law.

E-mail: Susan Drummond sdrummond [at] osgoode.yorku.ca
Assistant: Hazel Pollock hpollock [at] osgoode.yorku.ca


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Not just Muslim women are exploited by 'religious' law, Susan Drummond, September 9, 2005.

A front-page story in yesterday's Globe and Mail drew attention to the case of "Shinaz," a Muslim woman who was coerced by religious law and her imam into forfeiting support and property rights in order to get a religious divorce.

The full facts are a little bit buried in the latter part of the story, so let me bring them to the fore again: Before going to the imam, Shinaz went to a Canadian lawyer, worked out a separation agreement and got a settlement on child support, property and child custody. She then also got a divorce in a Canadian court. Following this, she wanted a religious divorce, though absolutely nothing in Canadian law compels, or indeed urges or even suggests, that she do so. What followed in the religious arena illustrates a long-standing tension between religious law and state law -- a tension that is in no way exclusive to Islam.

In the religious forum to which Shinaz voluntarily submitted, she found herself up against a potentially very exploitative wall.

Orthodox Jewish women have found themselves in that position for decades.

The Canadian state allows for civil divorce with all of its corollary relief (support, custody etc.). Orthodox Jewish law (the form of religious law that governs family law matters in Israel) demands that, if an Orthodox woman also wants to be released to remarry or to bear future children that would not be bastards (mamzarim) in Jewish law, she must go through a religious procedure to do so. Until she gets a Jewish bill of divorce -- known as a gett -- she is a bound woman, an agunah -- with potentially dire consequences associated with both Jewish law and Israel. The odd Jewish husband has long been exploiting this vulnerability by threatening to withhold the gett unless the wife, who is civilly divorced, agrees to forgo a long list of civil rights that she has already acquired (custody of the children, child support etc.) or is in the clear position to acquire according to Canadian law. I should state that this exploitation by a small number of Jewish men is also a thorn in the side of both Orthodox Judaism and the state of Israel.

Recognizing the extraordinary vulnerability that these Jewish women (analogous to Shinaz) find themselves in, the Canadian state and the provinces have long intervened to circumvent this kind of "religious" exploitation of state law -- or rather the exploitation of the intersection between the two. And, as multicultural as Canada is, we have done so in a way that is both creative and religion-neutral. Federal legislation allows for judges to stay civil divorces (e.g., of the Jewish man who wants to remarry but who wants to bind his wife for eternity in a religious marriage) if all barriers to religious marriage have not been removed. Under provincial and federal legislation, the civil courts will, if asked by one spouse, prevent the other from litigating on any issue pertaining to the divorce or separation (even, for example, preventing him from entering a defence to an astronomically high child- support claim) unless the latter has done all that is within his power to remove all religious barriers to remarriage.

In my opinion, Shinaz would have done well to do what countless Jewish agunot have done: Sue her husband for, say, a gargantuan increase in child support against which her ex-husband cannot raise a defence until all religious barriers to remarriage are removed. If it's important to Shinaz to remain devout to her religion and its institutions, she could have followed the letter of the latter's law while invoking the letter of Canada's parallel secular law -- all the while showing herself to be a devoutly law-abiding citizen.

With Canada's long and creative history of accommodating cultural and religious differences within the bosom of a secular state, Canadians have generated an ever-evolving model of the modern multicultural state that should be an inspiration to the world. The laws to which I allude have been around for a while to deal with the interaction between state law and Jewish religious law. If they need some tinkering to deal with other religions (again in language that does not single out a particular religion), then let's do that rather than single out the Muslim religion for a singular form of paranoia.

Susan Drummond, professor of family and comparative law at Osgoode Hall Law School at York University, holds a federal research grant to look into marriages within Israel's mixed legal jurisdiction.


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Beyond cartoons, Susan Drummond, February 11, 2006.

There's a lot we can learn about ourselves from the discomfort of others, says law professor Susan Drummond.

The recent furor over cartoons depicting the Prophet Mohammed brings to mind the admonition of French philosopher Simone Weil, who had debilitating migraines: "When I behold evil in the world, I must recollect to myself that when I am suffering from one of my headaches, I am overcome with the urge to strike out and hit somebody in the exact same spot in my head that I am hurting."

The whole cartoon debacle, which lamentably appears to be not fully spent, reminds me of another moment when the atmosphere was electrified with a similar climate of devastation, anguish, animosity, and suspicion.

A week into the first time I taught comparative law, the twin towers of the World Trade Center came down in front of the eyes of the students, staff, and faculty who gathered, aghast, in front of the electronic message board in the lobby of our law school. Ten minutes later, I was supposed to start teaching a diverse group of students the intricacies of common law, civil law, aboriginal law, Talmudic law, and Islamic law. Speechless myself, I cancelled the class and told the students who dribbled in, hollowed out, that I would be available if anybody wanted to talk. Somehow, we managed to get the course back on track over the next several weeks. And then, an interesting thing happened, not unlike the current debate about the relationship between the values of the secular and religious worlds.

I had just passed out a photocopied page of the Talmud so that students could see, graphically, how the spiralling and open-ended commentaries of one of Judaism's religious and legal texts contrasted with both Napoleon's and Justinian's efforts to bring all commentary to an end once their civil codes had been promulgated. During the break, I could see, out of the corner of my eye, one of my very devout Muslim students approach a very devout Lubovitch Jewish student. They had a small confabulation, and then they approached me. I was informed, by both, that passing out a page of a Jewish Holy Book was a particularly insensitive thing to do as it contained the name of God upon it and could be subjected to all manner of disrespectful treatment, even unwittingly, by those insufficiently versed in its holiness. I was further informed that the reproduction of the Koran on the cover of the comparative law text that I had selected that year was also prone to cause offence, reproducing, as it did, an image of the Koran. The Muslim student informed me that he felt compelled by his religion to cleanse himself each time he read the text and added, tongue in cheek I assume, that he could not take the book into the washroom with him as other students might.

I was completely taken aback by the intervention of these two students. I asked them what they wanted me to do in response to their concerns. They suggested I should ask the rest of the students to return the photocopied sheets of the Talmud to the Jewish student so that he could dispose of them in a manner consistent with the significance they held for him. I invited them to make the request of their colleagues. At the end of class, each student respectfully complied.

The exchange left me uneasy and unsettled about what had just taken place, and I remain so to this day. Osgoode is a secular institution, resting upon centuries of the same cherished traditions that infuse the value of freedom of speech. I am not teaching about any legal tradition under the assumption that its core tenets are inherently worthy of respect. I am teaching about each of them from the vantage of a critical distance cultivated over millenniums. Consistent with deeply entrenched values within the academy, I urge students to subject their understandings -- from the most commonplace to the most sacrosanct -- to the light of critical scrutiny.

And yet, I am aware that the familiar academic stance of detachment has the potential to objectify and thereby distort the object of its inquiry, particularly when the subject relates to an aspect of human society. I am also aware that such detachment is itself a deeply held and historically conditioned value, for which some of us have been prepared to die. One hears echoes of the virtues of that detached stance in recent commitments to the right of freedom of speech, some heartfelt and thoughtful, others callow.

I believe that things were resolved that day in an admirably pacific (and prototypically Canadian) manner. Indeed, Omar, the ever-mischievous Muslim student who initiated the exchange, presented a paper with me on the event at an international conference on law and society the following spring.

What if, however, there had been students who, within their rights (I believe), felt that the request that they treat religious texts with reverence was disconsonant with their own deeply held beliefs? What if they further argued (with reason, I believe) that the request was not wholly appropriate to the diverse and overarchingly secular law school environment? What if they declined to submit to the request of those two devoutly religious students?

I still don't know what I would have done, though I am almost certain that the ensuing conflict would have been fuel, propelling us to a deeper and more fine-grained understanding of each other. Comparative law begins from the premise that she who understands one legal tradition understands none, or to quote script from a sculpture on the campus of York University, a fish only recognizes water when it discovers air. Taking into account that the study of law touches upon values that also embody different senses of injustice, I urged my students that year not to simply understand unfamiliar texts and traditions from the vantage of a cold and purportedly neutral detachment, but to follow another of Simone Weil's admonitions: to understand the self from the point of view of the other's affliction.

I continue to be buoyed by the very fact that, in the electrified atmosphere that shot through the law school, the campus and, indeed, the world in the weeks following 9/11, a devout Muslim student felt moved to approach a devout Jewish student to query him about whether he felt pained by the way that a secular professor had handled one of his holy books -- and that they respectfully approached me and their colleagues with their concerns.

In the spirit of that year's comparative exercise, I hope we continue to shore up the compulsion to understand that keeps the ivory tower of the university, along with many of the other foundational structures of human society, in place.

Susan G. Drummond is a professor of comparative law at Osgoode Hall Law School at York University in Toronto.


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You really want them all charged?, Susan Drummond, August 5, 2008.

You might be surprised who would get caught in the dragnet.

There is a general rumbling afoot in Canada about laying polygamy charges against individuals within certain religious communities across Canada. But there are some things Canadians need to know about our Criminal Code's "Offences Against Conjugal Rights" before we can be sure we really want to open that particular Pandora's box. One thing to ask may be whether you, or anyone you care about, has committed one of these indictable offences carrying liability of up to five years in prison. In the spirit of the poem "They came first for the communists...," let me say that I have committed polygamy.

How is it that a Canadian professor of family law violated a very grave criminal prohibition - and yet remains on the lam; teaching the law, no less?

The first thing to know is that Canadians are not a morally squeamish group when it comes to sex - or sex and marriage. Group sex, the Supreme Court of Canada has held, even group sex in swingers bars in downtown Toronto, does not offend Canadian moral sensibilities. Nor does it offend the institution of marriage. For a divorce based on adultery, neither spouse can have condoned the other's extramarital sex - and swinging with your spouse at Ménage à Quatre almost certainly constitutes condonation. Swingers who want a divorce have to wait out one year's separation like the rest of us.

The second thing to bear in mind is that the polygamy provision has been invoked exactly once in the past century - in 1937. A man was charged with polygamy because he had an adulterous affair. The court held that adultery is not inconsistent with monogamy - and both he and the rest of our society have been free thereafter to have adulterous affairs with criminal impunity. Since the Divorce Act of 1986, spouses also have been free to commit adultery without consequence to determining child custody, support or division of property. Canadian law has left the adulterous to little more than the wrath of their spouses.

The third thing to know is the actual definition of both bigamy and polygamy in the Criminal Code. Amongst other elements, the offences include everyone in Canada who, being married, goes through a form of marriage with another person (bigamy) and everyone who enters into any kind of conjugal union with more than one person at the same time, whether or not this conjugal union is by law recognized as a binding form of marriage (polygamy).

Religious marriage (Catholic, Hindu, Muslim, Jewish etc) is a "form of marriage." Canadians can be civilly divorced and yet remain religiously married. The state, having no place in the religions of the nation, carries out only civil divorce. All Canadians, regardless of religious background, have equal access to the Divorce Act that allows for divorce on the grounds of the breakdown of the marriage (established by living separate and apart for one year, or by the adultery or cruelty of the other spouse). Catholics can never divorce religiously - and yet they can (and do) divorce and remarry civilly. Those who have done so (along with other Canadians who have not put an end to their religious marriage before remarrying civilly) are both in multiple conjugal unions and multiple forms of marriage. So, should the state decide to sweep up all those polygamists, many of us might be astonished at how many of our acquaintances and loved ones would be carted away.

Where I, and countless other Canadians, unwittingly committed polygamy derives from the inclusion of "any kind of conjugal union" in the definition of polygamy.

Like 38 per cent of Canadians, I both married and divorced. Like many Canadians, I was somewhat nonchalant about the institution of marriage. As common-law relationships gather about them all of the benefits of marriage and increasingly little social stigma, marriage has become a principally symbolic institution. While sorting out the incidentals of divorce (custody, support, etc.) was important to me, getting the actual divorce was not. Unlike the other weighty elements of Canadian family law, all a divorce enabled me to do was to remarry civilly. As I had no desire to remarry, I was living separate and apart from my "husband" for six years before I got a divorce (in order that he might remarry). My marriage was, if nothing else, the paradigmatic "conjugal union."

Without going into details, two years after my separation, I entered another "conjugal union" with my partner of the last seven years. This was not hard to do. The definition of "conjugal union" in Canadian law is broad enough that just about any kind of detail has the potential to be simultaneously sordid and banal.

What is "any kind" of conjugal union? On this point, the criminal law is silent. In family law, the definition of conjugal union used to include things such as the sharing of meals, sexual exchange, watching TV together (I kid you not) and the delivery of domestic services. With sexual and domestic services sitting uncomfortably with the obligations of conjugality, eating pizza with someone, while watching Sopranos reruns, could catch quite a few of us off guard.

In all fairness, I might call myself in to Crime Stoppers. If I am free to go, then with the current gapingly broad definition of an Offence Against Conjugal Rights, doesn't the state have an unfettered discretion to indiscriminately go after religious communities and individuals?

Susan Drummond is Professor of family law at Osgoode Hall Law School.


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A marriage of fear and xenophobia, Susan Drummond, April 6, 2009.

Canada signed the international Women's Convention in 1980, and thereby committed itself to "take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women in all matters relating to marriage and family relations." The convention recommends that states acknowledge that "polygamous marriage contravenes a woman's right to equality with men." Is there a way to square the decriminalization of polygamy with our international commitment in a way that does not prey on our fear of those who are different from us?

The Criminal Code's polygamy section, from its inception through its bizarre history of virtual non-use, has always been shrouded in an aura of xenophobia and racism. The provision itself was drafted in 1892 under pressure from the U.S. government, busy enacting its own criminal law targeting fundamentalist Mormons. We had no shame in similarly tailoring our polygamy law to single out this religious minority - a piece of blatant religious discrimination rectified only in 1954.

As American scholar Martha Ertman notes, the leading American case on polygamy from 1879 held that polygamy was "odious among the northern and western nations of Europe" and "almost exclusively a feature of the life of Asiatic and of African people."

One of the rare convictions under the polygamy section was against an aboriginal man who was living in a customary marriage with two women. The judge noted in the 1899 case: "It is plain that among the savage tribes on this continent marriage is merely a natural contract and that neither law, custom nor religion has affixed to it any conditions or limitations or forms other than what nature has itself prescribed." Under Canadian common law, for aboriginal people alone, consent constitutes marriage and living together constitutes consent - an understanding that was sufficient to tear Bear's Shin Bone from his family and community for five years in prison.

The conjunction of Canada's lonely conviction of an aboriginal man under the polygamy provision and this view of fundamentalist Mormons as race traitors should signal to us that the "family values" underpinning the section are poised to operate as a form of discipline for socially and politically marginalized people.

There are other ways of protecting women and children from abusive marriages (polygamous or monogamous) that don't lead us into these perilous waters. Many of these mechanisms are already at our disposal.

The Criminal Code clearly prohibits sexual activity between adults and children under the age of 16. If there is a shred of credible evidence that this criminal activity has been going on in Bountiful, B.C., then it is woefully lamentable that charges were not laid under these provisions. If wives are vulnerable to abuse in Bountiful, domestic abuse is a criminal offence under our assault provisions in the Criminal Code. Yet, the only charges coming out of Bountiful are under the anachronistic polygamy section.

Canadian child-support laws already go further than other countries in imposing obligations on biological parents and those who, like step-parents, stand in place of parents. No matter what the antecedent family configuration, both biological and psychological parents owe child support when separate households result. Both parents in polygamous and monogamous marriages are in this position. Indeed, some wives who think they are in monogamous marriages may be surprised to find that their husband's income (and potentially the household income) will be unequivocally diminished by his children with a mistress, whether or not she consents.

Some provinces already have laws in place that require spouses in polygamous marriages to divide up marital assets equally on separation, as per the default regime for monogamously married spouses. These laws have yet to be used, but the legislative framework is in place for divvying up a husband's pension and other assets among his wives.

Courts have already generated some surprising decisions on spousal support in which both mistresses and wives are entitled to their conjugal partner's support following separation - whether or not the wife was aware of the mistress's existence.

Women in polygamous marriages have fair and effective notice of their economic vulnerabilities to sister wives and their children. How many wives, whose husbands are surreptitiously in a conjugal relationship with a mistress, are aware of their financial exposure? One of the other rare prosecutions in the past 100 years under the polygamy provision established (through an acquittal) that adultery is perfectly consistent with monogamy. The sighs of relief from monogamously, but loosely, married husbands should be accompanied by a gulp of anxiety from their respectably married wives.

If we are serious about eliminating discrimination against women in all matters relating to marriage and family relations, how about instituting a national daycare program that would provide some assurance to mothers leaving any kind of crappy marriage that they might be able to afford decent child care while they work, train or educate themselves into financial independence? Research indicates that astonishing numbers of single mothers will return to abusive relationships rather than suffer the degradations and deprivations of welfare.

Maybe it's time we put some money where the solicitous mouth is. Meantime, decriminalizing polygamy and protecting women need not be mutually exclusive aspirations.

Susan Drummond teaches family law at Osgoode Hall Law School.

Down.

Saturday, 4 April 2009

Greed and stupidity, two narratives.

Up, Down.

"Stability, Growth, Jobs," they say.
How about: Survival, NOT Growth, and Dignity?
Growth is the PROBLEM folks, Doh!
What planet do these people live on I wonder?


G20 Summit Family AlbumG20 Summit Family AlbumG20 Summit Family AlbumG20 Summit Family AlbumG20 Summit Family AlbumG20 Summit Family AlbumG20 Summit Family AlbumG20 Summit Family AlbumG20 Summit Family Album

The G20 have met, pressed the flesh, had a good dinner, and agreed to another trillion to shore up the stinking stye. We had a glimpse of Michelle Obama; otherwise it was bogus balderdash from the mouths of maggots. A-and who is this capering clown at the right? If I call him a grinning 'gorilla' I guess I get called racist eh? It was ok to call Bush a baboon though ... looks like whatever it is must run in the 'family'.

G20, Greenpeace, Ponte Niterói, Rio de JaneiroA simple day; a day for alliteration and assonance ... simple enough even to include Greenpeace, who don't seem to want to put their message in Portugese, despite Lula being probably the only leader who looked at it. There is more to this ... the reason for using the lingua franca, english, is a typically American reason, and Greenpeace's origins are American, QED. And a corollary: ergo Greenpeace is part of the problem. But the solutions, if and when they come, will (I believe) be small-scale, and in the local dialect whatever it is.

The haste with which world governments are being railroaded into bailout measures is disquieting. The establishment tells us that unless we act immediately, catastrophe awaits. Consider the source – the very same crowd that didn’t see it coming. And what is the worst case consequence of no bailout?
    paraphrased from An Accident Waiting to Happen, Amar Bhidé.

In the NYT, David Brooks talks about 'two narratives', with reference to two additional articles. The three are below. Whatever.

My father told me to put away 10% of everything I earned so that I could opt out when I was ready. I did not follow his sage advice. How was I to know at that age? The next kicker was a friend of mine who 'cashed out' of what looked to me like a plum job at the tender age of 40. A-and then a young friend, who got an MBA, made some sort of a killing, and opted out at 28!

I was never able to read the writing on the wall. Oh well. have to become a Bhuddist instead I guess.

Epistemology is the theory (or science) of the method (or grounds) of knowledge.


Appendices:
1. Greed and Stupidity, David Brooks, April 2, 2009.
2. The Quiet Coup, Simon Johnson, The Atlantic, May 2009.
3. Our Epistemological Depression, Jerry Z. Muller, Thursday, January 29, 2009.

Interesting ... the OED (the privilege of using which costs $350US per year more-or-less) has an 'Advanced Search' feature. So I tried 'logy' and got 400 or so results ... BUT not including analogy or apology or etymology (?). The OED have clearly devolved too ...



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Greed and Stupidity, David Brooks, April 2, 2009.

What happened to the global economy? We seemed to be chugging along, enjoying moderate business cycles and unprecedented global growth. All of a sudden, all hell broke loose.

There are many theories about what happened, but two general narratives seem to be gaining prominence, which we will call the greed narrative and the stupidity narrative. The two overlap, but they lead to different ways of thinking about where we go from here.

The best single encapsulation of the greed narrative is an essay called “The Quiet Coup,” by Simon Johnson in The Atlantic (available online now).

Johnson begins with a trend. Between 1973 and 1985, the U.S. financial sector accounted for about 16 percent of domestic corporate profits. In the 1990s, it ranged from 21 percent to 30 percent. This decade, it soared to 41 percent.

In other words, Wall Street got huge. As it got huge, its prestige grew. Its compensation packages grew. Its political power grew as well. Wall Street and Washington merged as a flow of investment bankers went down to the White House and the Treasury Department.

The result was a string of legislation designed to further enhance the freedom and power of finance. Regulations separating commercial and investment banking were repealed. There were major increases in the amount of leverage allowed to investment banks.

The U.S. economy got finance-heavy and finance-mad, and finally collapsed. When it did, the elites did what all elites do. They took care of their own: “Money was used to recapitalize banks, buying shares in them on terms that were grossly favorable to the banks themselves,” Johnson writes.

In short, he argues, the U.S. financial crisis is a bigger version of the crises that have afflicted emerging-market nations for decades. An oligarchy takes control of the nation. The oligarchs get carried away and build an empire on mountains of debt. The whole thing comes crashing down. Johnson’s remedy is clear. Smash the oligarchy. Nationalize the banks. Sell them off in medium-size pieces. Revise antitrust laws so they can’t get back together. Find ways to limit executive compensation. Permanently reduce the size and power of Wall Street.

The second and, to me, more persuasive theory revolves around ignorance and uncertainty. The primary problem is not the greed of a giant oligarchy. It’s that overconfident bankers didn’t know what they were doing. They thought they had these sophisticated tools to reduce risk. But when big events — like the rise of China — fundamentally altered the world economy, their tools were worse than useless.

Many writers have described elements of this intellectual hubris. Amar Bhidé has described the fallacy of diversification. Bankers thought that if they bundled slices of many assets into giant packages then they didn’t have to perform due diligence on each one. In Wired, Felix Salmon described the false lure of the Gaussian copula function, the formula that gave finance whizzes the illusion that they could accurately calculate risks. Benoit Mandelbrot and Nassim Taleb have explained why extreme events are much more likely to disrupt financial markets than most bankers understood.

To me, the most interesting factor is the way instant communications lead to unconscious conformity. You’d think that with thousands of ideas flowing at light speed around the world, you’d get a diversity of viewpoints and expectations that would balance one another out. Instead, global communications seem to have led people in the financial subculture to adopt homogenous viewpoints. They made the same one-way bets at the same time.

Jerry Z. Muller wrote an indispensable version of the stupidity narrative in an essay called “Our Epistemological Depression” in The American magazine. What’s new about this crisis, he writes, is the central role of “opacity and pseudo-objectivity.” Banks got too big to manage. Instruments got too complex to understand. Too many people were good at math but ignorant of history.

The greed narrative leads to the conclusion that government should aggressively restructure the financial sector. The stupidity narrative is suspicious of that sort of radicalism. We’d just be trading the hubris of Wall Street for the hubris of Washington. The stupidity narrative suggests we should preserve the essential market structures, but make them more transparent, straightforward and comprehensible. Instead of rushing off to nationalize the banks, we should nurture and recapitalize what’s left of functioning markets.

Both schools agree on one thing, however. Both believe that banks are too big. Both narratives suggest we should return to the day when banks were focused institutions — when savings banks, insurance companies, brokerages and investment banks lived separate lives.

We can agree on that reform. Still, one has to choose a guiding theory. To my mind, we didn’t get into this crisis because inbred oligarchs grabbed power. We got into it because arrogant traders around the world were playing a high-stakes game they didn’t understand.


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The Quiet Coup, Simon Johnson, The Atlantic, May 2009.

The crash has laid bare many unpleasant truths about the United States. One of the most alarming, says a former chief economist of the International Monetary Fund, is that the finance industry has effectively captured our government—a state of affairs that more typically describes emerging markets, and is at the center of many emerging-market crises. If the IMF’s staff could speak freely about the U.S., it would tell us what it tells all countries in this situation: recovery will fail unless we break the financial oligarchy that is blocking essential reform. And if we are to prevent a true depression, we’re running out of time.

One thing you learn rather quickly when working at the International Monetary Fund is that no one is ever very happy to see you. Typically, your “clients” come in only after private capital has abandoned them, after regional trading-bloc partners have been unable to throw a strong enough lifeline, after last-ditch attempts to borrow from powerful friends like China or the European Union have fallen through. You’re never at the top of anyone’s dance card.

The reason, of course, is that the IMF specializes in telling its clients what they don’t want to hear. I should know; I pressed painful changes on many foreign officials during my time there as chief economist in 2007 and 2008. And I felt the effects of IMF pressure, at least indirectly, when I worked with governments in Eastern Europe as they struggled after 1989, and with the private sector in Asia and Latin America during the crises of the late 1990s and early 2000s. Over that time, from every vantage point, I saw firsthand the steady flow of officials—from Ukraine, Russia, Thailand, Indonesia, South Korea, and elsewhere—trudging to the fund when circumstances were dire and all else had failed.

Every crisis is different, of course. Ukraine faced hyperinflation in 1994; Russia desperately needed help when its short-term-debt rollover scheme exploded in the summer of 1998; the Indonesian rupiah plunged in 1997, nearly leveling the corporate economy; that same year, South Korea’s 30-year economic miracle ground to a halt when foreign banks suddenly refused to extend new credit.

But I must tell you, to IMF officials, all of these crises looked depressingly similar. Each country, of course, needed a loan, but more than that, each needed to make big changes so that the loan could really work. Almost always, countries in crisis need to learn to live within their means after a period of excess—exports must be increased, and imports cut—and the goal is to do this without the most horrible of recessions. Naturally, the fund’s economists spend time figuring out the policies—budget, money supply, and the like—that make sense in this context. Yet the economic solution is seldom very hard to work out.

No, the real concern of the fund’s senior staff, and the biggest obstacle to recovery, is almost invariably the politics of countries in crisis.

Typically, these countries are in a desperate economic situation for one simple reason—the powerful elites within them overreached in good times and took too many risks. Emerging-market governments and their private-sector allies commonly form a tight-knit—and, most of the time, genteel—oligarchy, running the country rather like a profit-seeking company in which they are the controlling shareholders. When a country like Indonesia or South Korea or Russia grows, so do the ambitions of its captains of industry. As masters of their mini-universe, these people make some investments that clearly benefit the broader economy, but they also start making bigger and riskier bets. They reckon—correctly, in most cases—that their political connections will allow them to push onto the government any substantial problems that arise.

In Russia, for instance, the private sector is now in serious trouble because, over the past five years or so, it borrowed at least $490 billion from global banks and investors on the assumption that the country’s energy sector could support a permanent increase in consumption throughout the economy. As Russia’s oligarchs spent this capital, acquiring other companies and embarking on ambitious investment plans that generated jobs, their importance to the political elite increased. Growing political support meant better access to lucrative contracts, tax breaks, and subsidies. And foreign investors could not have been more pleased; all other things being equal, they prefer to lend money to people who have the implicit backing of their national governments, even if that backing gives off the faint whiff of corruption.

But inevitably, emerging-market oligarchs get carried away; they waste money and build massive business empires on a mountain of debt. Local banks, sometimes pressured by the government, become too willing to extend credit to the elite and to those who depend on them. Overborrowing always ends badly, whether for an individual, a company, or a country. Sooner or later, credit conditions become tighter and no one will lend you money on anything close to affordable terms.

The downward spiral that follows is remarkably steep. Enormous companies teeter on the brink of default, and the local banks that have lent to them collapse. Yesterday’s “public-private partnerships” are relabeled “crony capitalism.” With credit unavailable, economic paralysis ensues, and conditions just get worse and worse. The government is forced to draw down its foreign-currency reserves to pay for imports, service debt, and cover private losses. But these reserves will eventually run out. If the country cannot right itself before that happens, it will default on its sovereign debt and become an economic pariah. The government, in its race to stop the bleeding, will typically need to wipe out some of the national champions—now hemorrhaging cash—and usually restructure a banking system that’s gone badly out of balance. It will, in other words, need to squeeze at least some of its oligarchs.

Squeezing the oligarchs, though, is seldom the strategy of choice among emerging-market governments. Quite the contrary: at the outset of the crisis, the oligarchs are usually among the first to get extra help from the government, such as preferential access to foreign currency, or maybe a nice tax break, or—here’s a classic Kremlin bailout technique—the assumption of private debt obligations by the government. Under duress, generosity toward old friends takes many innovative forms. Meanwhile, needing to squeeze someone, most emerging-market governments look first to ordinary working folk—at least until the riots grow too large.

Eventually, as the oligarchs in Putin’s Russia now realize, some within the elite have to lose out before recovery can begin. It’s a game of musical chairs: there just aren’t enough currency reserves to take care of everyone, and the government cannot afford to take over private-sector debt completely.

So the IMF staff looks into the eyes of the minister of finance and decides whether the government is serious yet. The fund will give even a country like Russia a loan eventually, but first it wants to make sure Prime Minister Putin is ready, willing, and able to be tough on some of his friends. If he is not ready to throw former pals to the wolves, the fund can wait. And when he is ready, the fund is happy to make helpful suggestions—particularly with regard to wresting control of the banking system from the hands of the most incompetent and avaricious “entrepreneurs.”

Of course, Putin’s ex-friends will fight back. They’ll mobilize allies, work the system, and put pressure on other parts of the government to get additional subsidies. In extreme cases, they’ll even try subversion—including calling up their contacts in the American foreign-policy establishment, as the Ukrainians did with some success in the late 1990s.

Many IMF programs “go off track” (a euphemism) precisely because the government can’t stay tough on erstwhile cronies, and the consequences are massive inflation or other disasters. A program “goes back on track” once the government prevails or powerful oligarchs sort out among themselves who will govern—and thus win or lose—under the IMF-supported plan. The real fight in Thailand and Indonesia in 1997 was about which powerful families would lose their banks. In Thailand, it was handled relatively smoothly. In Indonesia, it led to the fall of President Suharto and economic chaos.

From long years of experience, the IMF staff knows its program will succeed—stabilizing the economy and enabling growth—only if at least some of the powerful oligarchs who did so much to create the underlying problems take a hit. This is the problem of all emerging markets.

Becoming a Banana Republic

In its depth and suddenness, the U.S. economic and financial crisis is shockingly reminiscent of moments we have recently seen in emerging markets (and only in emerging markets): South Korea (1997), Malaysia (1998), Russia and Argentina (time and again). In each of those cases, global investors, afraid that the country or its financial sector wouldn’t be able to pay off mountainous debt, suddenly stopped lending. And in each case, that fear became self-fulfilling, as banks that couldn’t roll over their debt did, in fact, become unable to pay. This is precisely what drove Lehman Brothers into bankruptcy on September 15, causing all sources of funding to the U.S. financial sector to dry up overnight. Just as in emerging-market crises, the weakness in the banking system has quickly rippled out into the rest of the economy, causing a severe economic contraction and hardship for millions of people.

But there’s a deeper and more disturbing similarity: elite business interests—financiers, in the case of the U.S.—played a central role in creating the crisis, making ever-larger gambles, with the implicit backing of the government, until the inevitable collapse. More alarming, they are now using their influence to prevent precisely the sorts of reforms that are needed, and fast, to pull the economy out of its nosedive. The government seems helpless, or unwilling, to act against them.

Top investment bankers and government officials like to lay the blame for the current crisis on the lowering of U.S. interest rates after the dotcom bust or, even better—in a “buck stops somewhere else” sort of way—on the flow of savings out of China. Some on the right like to complain about Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac, or even about longer-standing efforts to promote broader homeownership. And, of course, it is axiomatic to everyone that the regulators responsible for “safety and soundness” were fast asleep at the wheel.

But these various policies—lightweight regulation, cheap money, the unwritten Chinese-American economic alliance, the promotion of homeownership—had something in common. Even though some are traditionally associated with Democrats and some with Republicans, they all benefited the financial sector. Policy changes that might have forestalled the crisis but would have limited the financial sector’s profits—such as Brooksley Born’s now-famous attempts to regulate credit-default swaps at the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, in 1998—were ignored or swept aside.

The financial industry has not always enjoyed such favored treatment. But for the past 25 years or so, finance has boomed, becoming ever more powerful. The boom began with the Reagan years, and it only gained strength with the deregulatory policies of the Clinton and George W. Bush administrations. Several other factors helped fuel the financial industry’s ascent. Paul Volcker’s monetary policy in the 1980s, and the increased volatility in interest rates that accompanied it, made bond trading much more lucrative. The invention of securitization, interest-rate swaps, and credit-default swaps greatly increased the volume of transactions that bankers could make money on. And an aging and increasingly wealthy population invested more and more money in securities, helped by the invention of the IRA and the 401(k) plan. Together, these developments vastly increased the profit opportunities in financial services.

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Not surprisingly, Wall Street ran with these opportunities. From 1973 to 1985, the financial sector never earned more than 16 percent of domestic corporate profits. In 1986, that figure reached 19 percent. In the 1990s, it oscillated between 21 percent and 30 percent, higher than it had ever been in the postwar period. This decade, it reached 41 percent. Pay rose just as dramatically. From 1948 to 1982, average compensation in the financial sector ranged between 99 percent and 108 percent of the average for all domestic private industries. From 1983, it shot upward, reaching 181 percent in 2007.

The great wealth that the financial sector created and concentrated gave bankers enormous political weight—a weight not seen in the U.S. since the era of J.P. Morgan (the man). In that period, the banking panic of 1907 could be stopped only by coordination among private-sector bankers: no government entity was able to offer an effective response. But that first age of banking oligarchs came to an end with the passage of significant banking regulation in response to the Great Depression; the reemergence of an American financial oligarchy is quite recent.

The Wall Street–Washington Corridor

Of course, the U.S. is unique. And just as we have the world’s most advanced economy, military, and technology, we also have its most advanced oligarchy.

In a primitive political system, power is transmitted through violence, or the threat of violence: military coups, private militias, and so on. In a less primitive system more typical of emerging markets, power is transmitted via money: bribes, kickbacks, and offshore bank accounts. Although lobbying and campaign contributions certainly play major roles in the American political system, old-fashioned corruption—envelopes stuffed with $100 bills—is probably a sideshow today, Jack Abramoff notwithstanding.

Instead, the American financial industry gained political power by amassing a kind of cultural capital—a belief system. Once, perhaps, what was good for General Motors was good for the country. Over the past decade, the attitude took hold that what was good for Wall Street was good for the country. The banking-and-securities industry has become one of the top contributors to political campaigns, but at the peak of its influence, it did not have to buy favors the way, for example, the tobacco companies or military contractors might have to. Instead, it benefited from the fact that Washington insiders already believed that large financial institutions and free-flowing capital markets were crucial to America’s position in the world.

One channel of influence was, of course, the flow of individuals between Wall Street and Washington. Robert Rubin, once the co-chairman of Goldman Sachs, served in Washington as Treasury secretary under Clinton, and later became chairman of Citigroup’s executive committee. Henry Paulson, CEO of Goldman Sachs during the long boom, became Treasury secretary under George W.Bush. John Snow, Paulson’s predecessor, left to become chairman of Cerberus Capital Management, a large private-equity firm that also counts Dan Quayle among its executives. Alan Greenspan, after leaving the Federal Reserve, became a consultant to Pimco, perhaps the biggest player in international bond markets.

These personal connections were multiplied many times over at the lower levels of the past three presidential administrations, strengthening the ties between Washington and Wall Street. It has become something of a tradition for Goldman Sachs employees to go into public service after they leave the firm. The flow of Goldman alumni—including Jon Corzine, now the governor of New Jersey, along with Rubin and Paulson—not only placed people with Wall Street’s worldview in the halls of power; it also helped create an image of Goldman (inside the Beltway, at least) as an institution that was itself almost a form of public service.

Wall Street is a very seductive place, imbued with an air of power. Its executives truly believe that they control the levers that make the world go round. A civil servant from Washington invited into their conference rooms, even if just for a meeting, could be forgiven for falling under their sway. Throughout my time at the IMF, I was struck by the easy access of leading financiers to the highest U.S. government officials, and the interweaving of the two career tracks. I vividly remember a meeting in early 2008—attended by top policy makers from a handful of rich countries—at which the chair casually proclaimed, to the room’s general approval, that the best preparation for becoming a central-bank governor was to work first as an investment banker.

A whole generation of policy makers has been mesmerized by Wall Street, always and utterly convinced that whatever the banks said was true. Alan Greenspan’s pronouncements in favor of unregulated financial markets are well known. Yet Greenspan was hardly alone. This is what Ben Bernanke, the man who succeeded him, said in 2006: “The management of market risk and credit risk has become increasingly sophisticated. … Banking organizations of all sizes have made substantial strides over the past two decades in their ability to measure and manage risks.”

Of course, this was mostly an illusion. Regulators, legislators, and academics almost all assumed that the managers of these banks knew what they were doing. In retrospect, they didn’t. AIG’s Financial Products division, for instance, made $2.5 billion in pretax profits in 2005, largely by selling underpriced insurance on complex, poorly understood securities. Often described as “picking up nickels in front of a steamroller,” this strategy is profitable in ordinary years, and catastrophic in bad ones. As of last fall, AIG had outstanding insurance on more than $400 billion in securities. To date, the U.S. government, in an effort to rescue the company, has committed about $180 billion in investments and loans to cover losses that AIG’s sophisticated risk modeling had said were virtually impossible.

Wall Street’s seductive power extended even (or especially) to finance and economics professors, historically confined to the cramped offices of universities and the pursuit of Nobel Prizes. As mathematical finance became more and more essential to practical finance, professors increasingly took positions as consultants or partners at financial institutions. Myron Scholes and Robert Merton, Nobel laureates both, were perhaps the most famous; they took board seats at the hedge fund Long-Term Capital Management in 1994, before the fund famously flamed out at the end of the decade. But many others beat similar paths. This migration gave the stamp of academic legitimacy (and the intimidating aura of intellectual rigor) to the burgeoning world of high finance.

As more and more of the rich made their money in finance, the cult of finance seeped into the culture at large. Works like Barbarians at the Gate, Wall Street, and Bonfire of the Vanities—all intended as cautionary tales—served only to increase Wall Street’s mystique. Michael Lewis noted in Portfolio last year that when he wrote Liar’s Poker, an insider’s account of the financial industry, in 1989, he had hoped the book might provoke outrage at Wall Street’s hubris and excess. Instead, he found himself “knee-deep in letters from students at Ohio State who wanted to know if I had any other secrets to share. … They’d read my book as a how-to manual.” Even Wall Street’s criminals, like Michael Milken and Ivan Boesky, became larger than life. In a society that celebrates the idea of making money, it was easy to infer that the interests of the financial sector were the same as the interests of the country—and that the winners in the financial sector knew better what was good for America than did the career civil servants in Washington. Faith in free financial markets grew into conventional wisdom—trumpeted on the editorial pages of The Wall Street Journal and on the floor of Congress.

From this confluence of campaign finance, personal connections, and ideology there flowed, in just the past decade, a river of deregulatory policies that is, in hindsight, astonishing:

• insistence on free movement of capital across borders;
• the repeal of Depression-era regulations separating commercial and investment banking;
• a congressional ban on the regulation of credit-default swaps;
• major increases in the amount of leverage allowed to investment banks;
• a light (dare I say invisible?) hand at the Securities and Exchange Commission in its regulatory enforcement;
• an international agreement to allow banks to measure their own riskiness;
• and an intentional failure to update regulations so as to keep up with the tremendous pace of financial innovation.

The mood that accompanied these measures in Washington seemed to swing between nonchalance and outright celebration: finance unleashed, it was thought, would continue to propel the economy to greater heights.

America’s Oligarchs and the Financial Crisis

The oligarchy and the government policies that aided it did not alone cause the financial crisis that exploded last year. Many other factors contributed, including excessive borrowing by households and lax lending standards out on the fringes of the financial world. But major commercial and investment banks—and the hedge funds that ran alongside them—were the big beneficiaries of the twin housing and equity-market bubbles of this decade, their profits fed by an ever-increasing volume of transactions founded on a relatively small base of actual physical assets. Each time a loan was sold, packaged, securitized, and resold, banks took their transaction fees, and the hedge funds buying those securities reaped ever-larger fees as their holdings grew.

Because everyone was getting richer, and the health of the national economy depended so heavily on growth in real estate and finance, no one in Washington had any incentive to question what was going on. Instead, Fed Chairman Greenspan and President Bush insisted metronomically that the economy was fundamentally sound and that the tremendous growth in complex securities and credit-default swaps was evidence of a healthy economy where risk was distributed safely.

In the summer of 2007, signs of strain started appearing. The boom had produced so much debt that even a small economic stumble could cause major problems, and rising delinquencies in subprime mortgages proved the stumbling block. Ever since, the financial sector and the federal government have been behaving exactly the way one would expect them to, in light of past emerging-market crises.

By now, the princes of the financial world have of course been stripped naked as leaders and strategists—at least in the eyes of most Americans. But as the months have rolled by, financial elites have continued to assume that their position as the economy’s favored children is safe, despite the wreckage they have caused.

Stanley O’Neal, the CEO of Merrill Lynch, pushed his firm heavily into the mortgage-backed-securities market at its peak in 2005 and 2006; in October 2007, he acknowledged, “The bottom line is, we—I—got it wrong by being overexposed to subprime, and we suffered as a result of impaired liquidity in that market. No one is more disappointed than I am in that result.” O’Neal took home a $14 million bonus in 2006; in 2007, he walked away from Merrill with a severance package worth $162 million, although it is presumably worth much less today.

In October, John Thain, Merrill Lynch’s final CEO, reportedly lobbied his board of directors for a bonus of $30 million or more, eventually reducing his demand to $10million in December; he withdrew the request, under a firestorm of protest, only after it was leaked to The Wall Street Journal. Merrill Lynch as a whole was no better: it moved its bonus payments, $4 billion in total, forward to December, presumably to avoid the possibility that they would be reduced by Bank of America, which would own Merrill beginning on January 1. Wall Street paid out $18 billion in year-end bonuses last year to its New York City employees, after the government disbursed $243 billion in emergency assistance to the financial sector.

In a financial panic, the government must respond with both speed and overwhelming force. The root problem is uncertainty—in our case, uncertainty about whether the major banks have sufficient assets to cover their liabilities. Half measures combined with wishful thinking and a wait-and-see attitude cannot overcome this uncertainty. And the longer the response takes, the longer the uncertainty will stymie the flow of credit, sap consumer confidence, and cripple the economy—ultimately making the problem much harder to solve. Yet the principal characteristics of the government’s response to the financial crisis have been delay, lack of transparency, and an unwillingness to upset the financial sector.

The response so far is perhaps best described as “policy by deal”: when a major financial institution gets into trouble, the Treasury Department and the Federal Reserve engineer a bailout over the weekend and announce on Monday that everything is fine. In March 2008, Bear Stearns was sold to JP Morgan Chase in what looked to many like a gift to JP Morgan. (Jamie Dimon, JP Morgan’s CEO, sits on the board of directors of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, which, along with the Treasury Department, brokered the deal.) In September, we saw the sale of Merrill Lynch to Bank of America, the first bailout of AIG, and the takeover and immediate sale of Washington Mutual to JP Morgan—all of which were brokered by the government. In October, nine large banks were recapitalized on the same day behind closed doors in Washington. This, in turn, was followed by additional bailouts for Citigroup, AIG, Bank of America, Citigroup (again), and AIG (again).

Some of these deals may have been reasonable responses to the immediate situation. But it was never clear (and still isn’t) what combination of interests was being served, and how. Treasury and the Fed did not act according to any publicly articulated principles, but just worked out a transaction and claimed it was the best that could be done under the circumstances. This was late-night, backroom dealing, pure and simple.

Throughout the crisis, the government has taken extreme care not to upset the interests of the financial institutions, or to question the basic outlines of the system that got us here. In September 2008, Henry Paulson asked Congress for $700 billion to buy toxic assets from banks, with no strings attached and no judicial review of his purchase decisions. Many observers suspected that the purpose was to overpay for those assets and thereby take the problem off the banks’ hands—indeed, that is the only way that buying toxic assets would have helped anything. Perhaps because there was no way to make such a blatant subsidy politically acceptable, that plan was shelved.

Instead, the money was used to recapitalize banks, buying shares in them on terms that were grossly favorable to the banks themselves. As the crisis has deepened and financial institutions have needed more help, the government has gotten more and more creative in figuring out ways to provide banks with subsidies that are too complex for the general public to understand. The first AIG bailout, which was on relatively good terms for the taxpayer, was supplemented by three further bailouts whose terms were more AIG-friendly. The second Citigroup bailout and the Bank of America bailout included complex asset guarantees that provided the banks with insurance at below-market rates. The third Citigroup bailout, in late February, converted government-owned preferred stock to common stock at a price significantly higher than the market price—a subsidy that probably even most Wall Street Journal readers would miss on first reading. And the convertible preferred shares that the Treasury will buy under the new Financial Stability Plan give the conversion option (and thus the upside) to the banks, not the government.

This latest plan—which is likely to provide cheap loans to hedge funds and others so that they can buy distressed bank assets at relatively high prices—has been heavily influenced by the financial sector, and Treasury has made no secret of that. As Neel Kashkari, a senior Treasury official under both Henry Paulson and Tim Geithner (and a Goldman alum) told Congress in March, “We had received inbound unsolicited proposals from people in the private sector saying, ‘We have capital on the sidelines; we want to go after [distressed bank] assets.’” And the plan lets them do just that: “By marrying government capital—taxpayer capital—with private-sector capital and providing financing, you can enable those investors to then go after those assets at a price that makes sense for the investors and at a price that makes sense for the banks.” Kashkari didn’t mention anything about what makes sense for the third group involved: the taxpayers.

Even leaving aside fairness to taxpayers, the government’s velvet-glove approach with the banks is deeply troubling, for one simple reason: it is inadequate to change the behavior of a financial sector accustomed to doing business on its own terms, at a time when that behavior must change. As an unnamed senior bank official said to The New York Times last fall, “It doesn’t matter how much Hank Paulson gives us, no one is going to lend a nickel until the economy turns.” But there’s the rub: the economy can’t recover until the banks are healthy and willing to lend.

The Way Out

Looking just at the financial crisis (and leaving aside some problems of the larger economy), we face at least two major, interrelated problems. The first is a desperately ill banking sector that threatens to choke off any incipient recovery that the fiscal stimulus might generate. The second is a political balance of power that gives the financial sector a veto over public policy, even as that sector loses popular support.

Big banks, it seems, have only gained political strength since the crisis began. And this is not surprising. With the financial system so fragile, the damage that a major bank failure could cause—Lehman was small relative to Citigroup or Bank of America—is much greater than it would be during ordinary times. The banks have been exploiting this fear as they wring favorable deals out of Washington. Bank of America obtained its second bailout package (in January) after warning the government that it might not be able to go through with the acquisition of Merrill Lynch, a prospect that Treasury did not want to consider.

The challenges the United States faces are familiar territory to the people at the IMF. If you hid the name of the country and just showed them the numbers, there is no doubt what old IMF hands would say: nationalize troubled banks and break them up as necessary.

In some ways, of course, the government has already taken control of the banking system. It has essentially guaranteed the liabilities of the biggest banks, and it is their only plausible source of capital today. Meanwhile, the Federal Reserve has taken on a major role in providing credit to the economy—the function that the private banking sector is supposed to be performing, but isn’t. Yet there are limits to what the Fed can do on its own; consumers and businesses are still dependent on banks that lack the balance sheets and the incentives to make the loans the economy needs, and the government has no real control over who runs the banks, or over what they do.

At the root of the banks’ problems are the large losses they have undoubtedly taken on their securities and loan portfolios. But they don’t want to recognize the full extent of their losses, because that would likely expose them as insolvent. So they talk down the problem, and ask for handouts that aren’t enough to make them healthy (again, they can’t reveal the size of the handouts that would be necessary for that), but are enough to keep them upright a little longer. This behavior is corrosive: unhealthy banks either don’t lend (hoarding money to shore up reserves) or they make desperate gambles on high-risk loans and investments that could pay off big, but probably won’t pay off at all. In either case, the economy suffers further, and as it does, bank assets themselves continue to deteriorate—creating a highly destructive vicious cycle.

To break this cycle, the government must force the banks to acknowledge the scale of their problems. As the IMF understands (and as the U.S. government itself has insisted to multiple emerging-market countries in the past), the most direct way to do this is nationalization. Instead, Treasury is trying to negotiate bailouts bank by bank, and behaving as if the banks hold all the cards—contorting the terms of each deal to minimize government ownership while forswearing government influence over bank strategy or operations. Under these conditions, cleaning up bank balance sheets is impossible.

Nationalization would not imply permanent state ownership. The IMF’s advice would be, essentially: scale up the standard Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation process. An FDIC “intervention” is basically a government-managed bankruptcy procedure for banks. It would allow the government to wipe out bank shareholders, replace failed management, clean up the balance sheets, and then sell the banks back to the private sector. The main advantage is immediate recognition of the problem so that it can be solved before it grows worse.

The government needs to inspect the balance sheets and identify the banks that cannot survive a severe recession. These banks should face a choice: write down your assets to their true value and raise private capital within 30 days, or be taken over by the government. The government would write down the toxic assets of banks taken into receivership—recognizing reality—and transfer those assets to a separate government entity, which would attempt to salvage whatever value is possible for the taxpayer (as the Resolution Trust Corporation did after the savings-and-loan debacle of the 1980s). The rump banks—cleansed and able to lend safely, and hence trusted again by other lenders and investors—could then be sold off.

Cleaning up the megabanks will be complex. And it will be expensive for the taxpayer; according to the latest IMF numbers, the cleanup of the banking system would probably cost close to $1.5trillion (or 10percent of our GDP) in the long term. But only decisive government action—exposing the full extent of the financial rot and restoring some set of banks to publicly verifiable health—can cure the financial sector as a whole.

This may seem like strong medicine. But in fact, while necessary, it is insufficient. The second problem the U.S. faces—the power of the oligarchy—is just as important as the immediate crisis of lending. And the advice from the IMF on this front would again be simple: break the oligarchy.

Oversize institutions disproportionately influence public policy; the major banks we have today draw much of their power from being too big to fail. Nationalization and re-privatization would not change that; while the replacement of the bank executives who got us into this crisis would be just and sensible, ultimately, the swapping-out of one set of powerful managers for another would change only the names of the oligarchs.

Ideally, big banks should be sold in medium-size pieces, divided regionally or by type of business. Where this proves impractical—since we’ll want to sell the banks quickly—they could be sold whole, but with the requirement of being broken up within a short time. Banks that remain in private hands should also be subject to size limitations.

This may seem like a crude and arbitrary step, but it is the best way to limit the power of individual institutions in a sector that is essential to the economy as a whole. Of course, some people will complain about the “efficiency costs” of a more fragmented banking system, and these costs are real. But so are the costs when a bank that is too big to fail—a financial weapon of mass self-destruction—explodes. Anything that is too big to fail is too big to exist.

To ensure systematic bank breakup, and to prevent the eventual reemergence of dangerous behemoths, we also need to overhaul our antitrust legislation. Laws put in place more than 100years ago to combat industrial monopolies were not designed to address the problem we now face. The problem in the financial sector today is not that a given firm might have enough market share to influence prices; it is that one firm or a small set of interconnected firms, by failing, can bring down the economy. The Obama administration’s fiscal stimulus evokes FDR, but what we need to imitate here is Teddy Roosevelt’s trust-busting.

Caps on executive compensation, while redolent of populism, might help restore the political balance of power and deter the emergence of a new oligarchy. Wall Street’s main attraction—to the people who work there and to the government officials who were only too happy to bask in its reflected glory—has been the astounding amount of money that could be made. Limiting that money would reduce the allure of the financial sector and make it more like any other industry.

Still, outright pay caps are clumsy, especially in the long run. And most money is now made in largely unregulated private hedge funds and private-equity firms, so lowering pay would be complicated. Regulation and taxation should be part of the solution. Over time, though, the largest part may involve more transparency and competition, which would bring financial-industry fees down. To those who say this would drive financial activities to other countries, we can now safely say: fine.

Two Paths

To paraphrase Joseph Schumpeter, the early-20th-century economist, everyone has elites; the important thing is to change them from time to time. If the U.S. were just another country, coming to the IMF with hat in hand, I might be fairly optimistic about its future. Most of the emerging-market crises that I’ve mentioned ended relatively quickly, and gave way, for the most part, to relatively strong recoveries. But this, alas, brings us to the limit of the analogy between the U.S. and emerging markets.

Emerging-market countries have only a precarious hold on wealth, and are weaklings globally. When they get into trouble, they quite literally run out of money—or at least out of foreign currency, without which they cannot survive. They must make difficult decisions; ultimately, aggressive action is baked into the cake. But the U.S., of course, is the world’s most powerful nation, rich beyond measure, and blessed with the exorbitant privilege of paying its foreign debts in its own currency, which it can print. As a result, it could very well stumble along for years—as Japan did during its lost decade—never summoning the courage to do what it needs to do, and never really recovering. A clean break with the past—involving the takeover and cleanup of major banks—hardly looks like a sure thing right now. Certainly no one at the IMF can force it.

In my view, the U.S. faces two plausible scenarios. The first involves complicated bank-by-bank deals and a continual drumbeat of (repeated) bailouts, like the ones we saw in February with Citigroup and AIG. The administration will try to muddle through, and confusion will reign.

Boris Fyodorov, the late finance minister of Russia, struggled for much of the past 20 years against oligarchs, corruption, and abuse of authority in all its forms. He liked to say that confusion and chaos were very much in the interests of the powerful—letting them take things, legally and illegally, with impunity. When inflation is high, who can say what a piece of property is really worth? When the credit system is supported by byzantine government arrangements and backroom deals, how do you know that you aren’t being fleeced?

Our future could be one in which continued tumult feeds the looting of the financial system, and we talk more and more about exactly how our oligarchs became bandits and how the economy just can’t seem to get into gear.

The second scenario begins more bleakly, and might end that way too. But it does provide at least some hope that we’ll be shaken out of our torpor. It goes like this: the global economy continues to deteriorate, the banking system in east-central Europe collapses, and—because eastern Europe’s banks are mostly owned by western European banks—justifiable fears of government insolvency spread throughout the Continent. Creditors take further hits and confidence falls further. The Asian economies that export manufactured goods are devastated, and the commodity producers in Latin America and Africa are not much better off. A dramatic worsening of the global environment forces the U.S. economy, already staggering, down onto both knees. The baseline growth rates used in the administration’s current budget are increasingly seen as unrealistic, and the rosy “stress scenario” that the U.S. Treasury is currently using to evaluate banks’ balance sheets becomes a source of great embarrassment.

Under this kind of pressure, and faced with the prospect of a national and global collapse, minds may become more concentrated.

The conventional wisdom among the elite is still that the current slump “cannot be as bad as the Great Depression.” This view is wrong. What we face now could, in fact, be worse than the Great Depression—because the world is now so much more interconnected and because the banking sector is now so big. We face a synchronized downturn in almost all countries, a weakening of confidence among individuals and firms, and major problems for government finances. If our leadership wakes up to the potential consequences, we may yet see dramatic action on the banking system and a breaking of the old elite. Let us hope it is not then too late.

Simon Johnson, a professor at MIT’s Sloan School of Management, was the chief economist at the International Monetary Fund during 2007 and 2008. He blogs about the financial crisis, along with James Kwak, who also contributed to this essay.


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Our Epistemological Depression, Jerry Z. Muller, Thursday, January 29, 2009.

Major recessions are characterized by something novel. Opacity and pseudo-objectivity created the crisis today.

The history of socialism is the history of failure—and so is the history of capitalism, but in a different sense. For the history of socialism is one of fundamental failure, a failure to provide incentives and an inability to coordinate information about supply and effective demand. The history of capitalism, by contrast, is the history of dialectical failure: it is a history of the creation of new institutions and practices that may be successful, even transformative for a while, but which eventually prove dysfunctional, either because their intrinsic weaknesses become more evident over time or because of a change in external circumstances. Historically, these institutional failures have led to two reactions. They lead to governmental attempts to reform corporate and financial institutions, through changes in law and regulation (such as limited liability laws, creation of the FDIC, the SEC, etc.). They also lead market institutions to reform themselves, as investors and managers learn what forms of organization and which practices are dysfunctional. The history of capitalism, then, is the history of success through dialectical failure.

History rarely repeats itself. There are some standard patterns in economic recessions, but major recessions are characterized by something novel. If only this were not the case: economists have devoted a great deal of attention to learning the lessons of the Great Depression that began in 1929, not least Ben Bernanke. As a result, we are unlikely to make the errors of monetary policy made by the Fed in that era (of tightening money when it should have been loosened); or the errors of fiscal policy made by the Treasury (such as raising taxes when they should have been lowered); or the errors of ideological tone made during the 1930s, when anticapitalist rhetoric frightened many potential investors from making new investments. In all of these respects, we have learned from the past.

Unfortunately, initial conditions are too different from case to case to simply apply some historical template that would permit us to fully understand what is currently happening, let alone how to deal with it. Instead of explaining why this recession (or depression) is just like the others, we should attend to what is new and especially problematic about the current downturn and why it may not respond to policies modeled on avoiding the errors of the past.

What is old and what is new in the current economic downturn? Major recessions typically begin with a rapid change of prices in the market for some asset or commodity; that price decline then affects financial institutions (banks), leading to a decline in the availability of credit, and then to a decline in commercial activity. Usually, then, localized crises in capitalist societies are reflected in the financial sector. When the crisis reaches the financial sector, it becomes a more general crisis.

This time, too, there is an underlying commodity bubble, namely in housing. But it has had much wider ramifications, because financial institutions have become interconnected in two unprecedented ways. First, once distinct financial services became interconnected: banking, credit, insurance, and the trading of derivatives have become interlinked because they are conducted by the same companies. Second, financial institutions are more connected across national borders, so that there are entities across the globe that invested in toxic American-made instruments and are suffering as a result (including municipalities in Norway that invested tax revenues in American collateralized debt obligations, now worth 15 percent of their face value).

What we have is not so much the crisis of some underlying commodity that gets reflected in the financial system, as a crisis caused within the financial system itself. The most important bubble of the last decade or so was not of the housing sector, but of the financial sector, a bubble reflected by the 20 percent of S & P 500 profits that were made in the financial sector.

Some of the causes of our contemporary crisis are well known by now. There were governmental errors: monetary policy that was too loose; government monitoring agencies that were too lax; and government policies specifically intended to encourage home ownership among African-Americans and Hispanics that had the unintended but quite anticipatable effect of extending mortgages to those who lacked the ability to repay them. There were perverse alignments of market incentives, incentives that put personal interests at odds with corporate interests, and corporate interests at odds with the public interest. There were principal-agent problem within firms, where traders were remunerated with bonuses for selling collateralized debt obligations without regard to the long-run viability of the underlying assets. Rating agencies were corrupted because they were paid by the sellers of the goods they rated, offering unreliable evaluations that redounded against the purchasers of mortgage-backed securities. Large profits were made by companies that packaged and sold mortgages and mortgage-backed securities without needing to be concerned with their ultimate viability. It turns out that intermediation of risk reduces the incentives for adequate risk management: so long as risk is intermediated, from a mortgage loan broker to a commercial bank to an investment bank to an investor, there is really no incentive, at each stage of the game, to have adequate risk-managing policies in place.

These factors have received a good deal of attention. But they are not the whole story, and certainly not the most original part of the predicament. What seems most novel is the role of opacity and pseudo-objectivity. This may be our first epistemologically-driven depression. (Epistemology is the branch of philosophy that deals with the nature and limits of knowledge, with how we know what we think we know.) That is, a large role was played by the failure of the private and corporate actors to understand what they were doing. Most heads of ailing or deceased financial institutions did not comprehend the degree of risk and exposure entailed by the dealings of their underlings—and many investors, including municipalities and pension funds, bought financial instruments without understanding the risks involved. We should keep this in mind when we chastise government agencies such as the SEC for failing to monitor what was going on. If the leading executives of financial firms failed to understand what was taking place, how could we expect government regulators to do so? The financial system created a fog so thick that even its captains could not navigate it.

Recognizing the novel element of the present crisis means that getting out of it will require more than wise monetary and fiscal policy. Getting us out of the current mess requires calling into question several cultural patterns that have driven our corporate economy in recent decades. These are belief in the virtues of diversification and complexity, which are both supposed to reduce risk, and in the virtue of accountability, which is understood as rewarding performance based on ostensible measures of objectivity. Each of these has turned out to have unintended and unanticipated negative consequences. The purported virtues have mutated into vices.

The diversification of investment, which was intended to reduce risk to institutional investors, ended up spreading risk more widely, as investors across the country and around the world found themselves holding mortgage-backed American securities of declining and indeterminate value. There was a belief in the financial sector that diversification of assets was a substitute for due diligence on each asset, so that if one bundled enough assets together, one didn’t have to know much about the assets themselves. The creation of securities based on a pool of diverse assets (mortgage loans, student loans, credit card receivables, etc.) meant that when markets declined radically, it became impossible to determine an accurate price for the security.

There was also the fallacy of diversification of activities within the firm. This was predicated on the belief that the more areas you are financially involved in, the more protected you are from loss in any one area. But the unintended consequence of this is that the more areas you are involved in, the less you know about them, and the more subject you are to unexpected and unanticipated shocks, especially when the assets decline in tandem.

The diversification of financial firms, which was supposed to create efficiencies and synergies, ended up spreading contagion, as investment banks and other financial institutions such as AIG (once a successful insurance company) were brought down by divisions specializing in real estate or in derivatives.

The complexity of newly created financial instruments, which were supposed to use mathematical sophistication to diminish risk, ended up creating opacity—an inability of any but a few analysts to get a clear sense of what was happening. And the creation of arcane financial instruments made effective supervision virtually impossible, both by superiors in the firm, and by outside regulators.

The cult of “accountability” was related to diversification. As companies grew larger and more diverse in their holdings, new layers of management were needed to supervise and coordinate their disparate units. From the point of view of top management, the diversity of operations means that executives were managing assets and services with which they have little familiarity. This has led to the spread of pseudo-objectivity: the search for standardized measures of achievement across large and disparate organizations. Its implicit premises were these: that information which is numerically measurable is the only sort of knowledge necessary; that numerical data can substitute for other forms of inquiry; and that numerical acumen can substitute for practical knowledge about the underlying assets and services.

A good deal of our current economic travails can be traced to this increasing valuation of purportedly objective criteria, so denoted because they can be expressed and manipulated in mathematical form by people who may be skilled at such manipulation but who lack “concrete” knowledge or experience of the things being made or traded. As Niall Ferguson has put it, “Those whom the gods want to destroy they first teach math.” The paradigm—and the precursor of our current crisis—was the rise and fall of Long Term Capital Management, founded by two of the fathers of quantitative options financing, Myron Scholes and Robert C. Merton. Knowing a great deal of math, but not very much history, they developed trading models that radically underestimated the risk entailed in their financial speculation, leading to a dramatic collapse of the company in the summer of 1998. But the phenomenon is more widespread. Attaching a number creates a belief that the information is more solid than is actually the case. That is what I mean by “pseudo-objectivity.” In each case, it is a response to what (to recoin a phrase) one might call alienation from the means of production, the attempt to substitute abstract and quantitative knowledge for concrete and qualitative knowledge.

The cult of “accountability” was linked to key innovations that turned out to have unanticipated undersides. One was the shibboleth of linking pay to performance, which put a premium on schemes that purported to measure performance. This tended to produce “hard” numbers that seemed reliable but were not. It created tremendous incentives for CEOs, executives, and traders to devote their creative energies to gaming the metrics, i.e. into coming up with schemes that purported to demonstrate productivity or profit by massaging the data, or by underinvesting in maintenance and human capital formation to boost quarterly earnings or their equivalents.

Two milestones in the process of creating the fog of finance were the transformation of Wall Street investment banks from private partnerships to publicly traded corporations (beginning with Salomon Brothers in 1986), and the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 through the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999. The former created tremendous incentives for risk-taking, since the firms no longer invested using the money of their top executives, who instead were remunerated based in large part on the amount of business the firm conducted, creating incentives to increase business by producing ever more complex and opaque financial instruments, such as collateralized debt obligations, swaps, etc. Then along came Gramm-Leach-Bliley, which opened the door to unlimited contagion, so that when one financial sector turned downward, it took the rest with it.

Looking ahead, the sort of government regulation and private re-organization that will be most beneficial will focus on these epistemological problems. Some of this goes under the rubric of transparency: making the asset holdings of financial institutions more publicly visible in order to reduce the problem of counterparty risk. Equally desirable would be transparency through the reduction of complexity, which includes avoiding intra-institutional contagion through greater limits on the ability of financial institutions to engage in an open-ended variety of financial activities. It means, in short, the reformulation of something like the Glass-Steagall Act, which would separate savings banks, investment banks, insurance and brokerage from one another.

Over and above government action, private individuals and firms should make decisions with these epistemological considerations in mind. That would mean avoiding firms that are “too complex to manage” in Amar Bhidé’s memorable phrase. Companies should not expand beyond the ability of top management to comprehend the firm’s actual activities. That will mean smaller and less diversified firms. Investors may want to ask the question: is this firm so big, or engaged in such diverse activities that its management doesn’t understand the activities in which it is involved? (And by understand, I don’t mean simply the ability to read a current balance sheet, but rather to understand the underlying dynamics of the products or services being provided.) If not, decide to invest elsewhere.

This message has not yet taken hold among public policy makers. There is much talk about monetary policy and fiscal stimulus. But without financial institutions that people have faith in, a fiscal stimulus is unlikely to have much of a multiplier effect. It is widely assumed that people will have faith in financial institutions if the Treasury injects capital into them. But the problem is not just that major financial institutions are short on operating capital: it is that recent experience seems to show that they are incapable of prudently managing the capital they have. In short, economic actors believe that other economic actors don’t know what they’re doing. Nor is the problem merely one of isolating “bad assets”—it is of a system that creates bad assets because of misaligned incentives and the fog created by opacity and pseudo-objectivity.

Confidence cannot just be conjured out of air. Nor can it be created with injections of capital or fiscal stimulus. It will be rebuilt to the extent that financial institutions take actions that lead us to believe that they know what they are doing. And they are more likely to know what they are doing if they are smaller, less diversified, and less engaged with financial instruments that are too clever by half.

Some recent policies seem likely to exacerbate the problems I’ve outlined. Take the Treasury’s encouragement of institutional consolidation through amalgamation. Bank of America was encouraged to take over Merrill Lynch; and JPMorgan Chase took over Bear Stearns, and then bought the assets of Washington Mutual. Whatever the purported advantages of these takeovers, the creation of ever larger and more diversified companies makes it more likely that these firms will be plagued by the epistemological problems noted above. The Treasury has created more firms that can’t really be understood (or whose riskiness can’t be assessed)—not by their managers, not by government regulators, and not by investors.

To speak of a crisis of financial epistemology may sound abstract, but it has had very concrete and disastrous consequences. Understanding this underrated aspect of our current crisis is a prerequisite for getting us out of the hole we’ve dug ourselves into.

Jerry Z. Muller is a history professor at The Catholic University of America and the author of “The Mind and the Market: Capitalism in Modern European Thought” (2002). His course “Thinking about Capitalism” has just been released by The Teaching Company.

Editor’s note: Amar Bhide has asked that it be noted that some of the ideas in this essay draw upon his articles, "An accident waiting to happen," which appeared on his website, and "Insiders and Outsiders," which appeared on Forbes.com.

Down.

Friday, 3 April 2009

Braidwood Inquiry - Nothing left but expletives.

Up, Down, In This Thread.

Iwona Kosowska“You're trying to make a bad person out of him, which means you can kill a bad person but you cannot kill a good person.”
        Iwona Kosowska, witness.

Two weeks hiatus for march Break and now the Braidwood Inquiry is taking another week off. Easter I guess. Life is good and life is easy among the legal elites.

I guessed at lawyer's rates the other day - came up with a grand a day - WRONG! Try $750 an HOUR; 8 hours of that is 6 GRAND PER DAY. They are making a killing so to speak.

I watched a few hours of the 'proceedings' on Tuesday, and another few on Thursday. I wish I had seen Iwona Kosowska's exchange with Ravi Hira but I didn't know there was a CBC web-cam in play at the time - and the transcripts are not available yet.

The pussy footing servile politeness in the tone and content of remarks by David Butcher and Ravi Hira, two of the Mountie lawyers, particularly towards Thomas Braidwood, and Braidwood's tone in response indicates that he has whacked their little legal pee-pees over the attempted character assassination of Robert Dziekanski. No love lost between them I would say. Good for Braidwood.

But Braidwood himself looked unkempt, and lost his thread at least once. It looks as if the strain is taking its toll on an old retired guy.

Everyone except the RCMP is demanding that the decision not to charge these men be revisted. Wally Oppal has opined that this may be possible once he has Braidwood's report in his hands. But when will that be?

Say, another few weeks of testimony; a month minimum to cook up the report - June July time. By then the Canadian attention span may have run its course.

It all leads me to expect a whitewash in the end.

Braidwood Inquiry“I’m a citizen that cares about innocent Polish people. These cops ain’t gonna see any Fucking time for this.

There’s no justice in this country. These cops aren’t going to see any Fucking time. Fucking snakes! Fucking losers!”

        Unidentified onlooker 'acting out'. (I second.)

Robert Dziekanski


“Are you out of your mind?!”
        Robert Dziekanski, April 15 1967 - October 14 2007, last words.


Good question Robert.

Down.